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ABSTRACT
We revisit one of the central empirical findings of the political economy literature that higher income
per capita causes democracy. Existing studies establish a strong cross-country correlation between
income and democracy, but do not typically control for factors that simultaneously affect both
variables. We show that controlling for such factors by including country fixed effects removes the
statistical association between income per capita and various measures of democracy. We also
present instrumental-variables using two different strategies. These estimates also show no causal
effect of income on democracy. Furthermore, we reconcile the positive cross-country correlation
between income and democracy with the absence of a causal effect of income on democracy by
showing that the long-run evolution of income and democracy is related to historical factors.
Consistent with this, the positive correlation between income and democracy disappears, even
without fixed effects, when we control for the historical determinants of economic and political









Sloan School of Management
MIT, 50 Memorial Drive















One of the most notable empirical regularities in political economy is the relationship
between income per capita and democracy. Today all OECD countries are democratic,
while many of the nondemocracies are in the poor parts of the world, for example sub-
Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. This positive relationship is not only conﬁned to a
cross-country comparison. Most countries were nondemocratic before the modern growth
process took oﬀ at the beginning of the 19th century. Democratization came together
with growth. Barro (1999, S160), for example, summarizes the ﬁndings from his detailed
study as: “increases in various measures of the standard of living forecast a gradual rise
in democracy. In contrast, democracies that arise without prior economic development ...
tend not to last.”1
This statistical association between income and democracy is the cornerstone of the
inﬂuential modernization theory, which sees a direct causal link between economic growth
and democracy. According to this theory, economic growth engenders “a culture of democ-
racy” and provides the foundations for democratic political institutions. This thesis is
clearly articulated in Lipset (1959), who argued that “only in a wealthy society in which
relatively few citizens lived in real poverty could a situation exist in which the mass of the
population could intelligently participate in politics and could develop the self-restraint
necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues” (p. 75). It
is also reproduced in all the major works on democracy (e.g., Dahl, 1971, Huntington,
1991).
In this paper, we revisit the relationship between income per capita and democracy.
Our starting point is that existing work, based on cross-country relationships, does not
establish causation. First, there is the issue of reverse causality; perhaps democracy
causes income rather than the other way round. Second, and more important, there is
the potential for omitted variable bias. Some other factor may determine both the nature
of the political regime and the potential for economic growth.
We utilize two strategies to investigate the causal eﬀe c to fi n c o m eo nd e m o c r a c y .O u r
ﬁrst strategy is to control for country-speciﬁcf a c t o r sa ﬀecting both income and democ-
racy by including country ﬁxed eﬀects. While ﬁxed eﬀect regressions are not a panacea
against omitted variable biases,2 they are well-suited to the investigation of the relation-
1Also see, among others, Lipset (1959), Londregan and Poole (1996), Przeworski and Limongi (1997),
Barro (1997), Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000), and Papaioannou and Siourounis
(2004).
2Fixed eﬀects would not help inference if there are time-varying omitted factors aﬀecting the dependent
variable and correlated with the right-hand side variables (see the discussion below). They may also make
1ship between income and democracy. Major sources of potential bias in a regression of
democracy on income per capita are country-speciﬁc, historical factors inﬂuencing both
political and economic development. If these omitted characteristics are, to a ﬁrst approx-
imation, time-invariant, the inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects will remove them and this source of
bias. Consider, for example, the comparison of the United States and Colombia. The
United States is both richer and more democratic, so a simple cross-country comparison,
as well as the existing empirical strategies in the literature which do not control for ﬁxed
eﬀects, would suggest that there is a relationship between democracy and income. The
idea of ﬁxed eﬀects is to move beyond this comparison and investigate the “within-country
variation”; i.e., whether as Colombia becomes relatively richer, it also tends to become
more democratic relative to the United States. In addition to improving inference on
the causal eﬀect of income on democracy, this approach is also more closely related to
modernization theory as articulated by Lipset (1959), which claims that countries should
become more democratic as they become richer, not simply that rich countries should be
more democratic.
Our main ﬁnding from this strategy is that once ﬁxed eﬀects are introduced, the
positive relationship between income per capita and various measures of democracy dis-
appears. Figures 1 and 2 show this diagrammatically by plotting changes in our two
measures of democracy, the Freedom House and Polity scores (see below for data details),
for each country between 1970 and 1995 against the change in GDP per capita over the
same period. There appears to be no relationship between changes in income per capita
and democracy.
This basic ﬁnding holds with various indicators for democracy, with diﬀerent econo-
metric speciﬁcations and estimation techniques, in diﬀerent subsamples, and is robust to
the inclusion of additional covariates. Moreover, these results are not driven by large
standard errors. In many cases, two-standard error bands include only very small eﬀects
of income on democracy, and often exclude the OLS estimates. These results therefore
shed considerable doubt on the claim that there is a strong causal eﬀect of income on
democracy.3
While the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation is useful in removing the inﬂuence of long-run deter-
problems of measurement error worse because they remove a signiﬁcant portion of the variation in the
right-hand side variables. Consequently, ﬁxed eﬀects are certainly no substitute for using an instrumental-
variables approach with a valid instrument.
3It remains true that over time there is a general tendency towards greater incomes and greater
democracy across the world. In our regressions, time eﬀects capture these general (world-level) tendencies.
Our estimates suggest that these world-level movements in democracy are unlikely to be driven by the
causal eﬀect of income on democracy.
2minants of both democracy and income, it does not necessarily estimate the causal eﬀect
of income on democracy. An instrumental-variables (IV) strategy with a valid instrument
would be a superior approach, but it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd valid instruments for income that
could not aﬀect democracy through other channels.4 Our second strategy is to use IV re-
gressions. We experiment with two potential instruments. The ﬁrst is to use past savings
rates, while the second is to use changes in the incomes of trading partners. The argument
for the ﬁr s ti n s t r u m e n ti st h a tv a r i a t i o n si np a s ts a v i n g sr a t e sa ﬀect income per capita,
but should have no direct eﬀect on democracy. The second instrument, which we believe
is of independent interest, creates a matrix of trade shares, and constructs predicted in-
come for each country using a trade-share-weighted average income of other countries.
We show that this predicted income has considerable explanatory power for income per
c a p i t a ,a n da r g u et h a ti ts h o u l dh a v en od i r e c te ﬀect on democracy. Both IV strategies
conﬁrm our basic ﬁndings and show no evidence of a causal eﬀect of income on democ-
racy. We recognize that neither instrument is perfect, since there are some reasonable
scenarios in which our exclusion restrictions could be violated (e.g., saving rates might
be correlated with future anticipated regime changes; or democracy scores of a country’s
trading partners, which are correlated with their income levels, might have a direct eﬀect
on its democracy). To alleviate concerns about the validity of the instruments, we show
that the most likely sources of correlation between our instruments and the error term in
the second stage are not present.
These results naturally raise the following important question: what is the source of
the cross-sectional correlation between income and democracy? Why are rich countries
democratic today? One possible explanation is that there is a causal eﬀect of income on
democracy, but it works at much longer horizons than the existing literature posited, that
is, over 50 or even 100 years rather than 10 or 20 years. Another hypothesis, suggested by
approaches that emphasize the importance of historical factors in long-run development,5
is that the cross-sectional relationship reﬂects the persistent inﬂuence of these historical
factors. Put diﬀerently, events during certain crucial junctures impact the economic and
political “development path” of a society, leading to persistent, though not permanent,
inﬂuences on economic and political outcomes. Both of these hypotheses suggest that the
within-correlation between income and democracy should be stronger when we look at
4A recent creative attempt is by Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004), who use the weather conditions
as an instrument for income in Africa for investigating the impact of income on civil wars. Unfortunately,
weather conditions are only a good instrument for relatively short-run changes in income, thus not
necessarily ideal to study the relationship between income and democracy.
5See, among others, North and Thomas (1973), North (1981), Jones (1981), Engerman and Sokoloﬀ
(1997), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002).
3longer horizons.
We investigate this possibility by looking at the relationship between income and
democracy over the past 160 years, and over the past 500 years. We ﬁnd little evidence
for an eﬀect of income on democracy in samples that span 100 or 160 years. In contrast,
over the past 500 years there seems to be a very strong correlation. Our interpretation
is that this pattern is consistent with the second hypothesis, because the 500 years in
question spans the period of divergence of national development paths (e.g., the emergence
of constitutional monarchies, the rise of the modern nation state, industrialization, and
the colonial experience).
In addition, we also provide direct evidence consistent with the second hypothesis by
looking at the sample of former European colonies. This sample is useful since it enables
us to exploit the quasi-natural experiment provided by the colonization of many diverse
societies by European powers after 1492, where diﬀerences in the colonization experience
led to signiﬁcant divergence in the economic and political development paths of these soci-
eties (see, e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2002, and Engerman and Sokoloﬀ,
1997). We document that in this sample, the ﬁxed eﬀects in the democracy regressions
are closely linked to the potential determinants of European colonization strategy (in par-
ticular, the density of the indigenous population at the time of colonization and potential
mortality rates of European settlers), date of independence and measures of institutions
in the early independence era. The positive correlation between income and democracy
disappears, even without ﬁxed eﬀects, when we control for these historical determinants.
This evidence further supports the second hypothesis.
F i n a l l y ,w ed o c u m e n tt h a tt h e r ea r es o m ei n c o m e - r e l a t e dd e t e r m i n a n t so fd e m o c r a c y
in the postwar sample. In particular, contrary to the implications of modernization theory,
we ﬁnd that economic crises lead to democracy. We show that this result is driven entirely
by the fact that dictatorships are more likely to collapse in the face of economic crises
than democracies are likely to revert back to dictatorship.6
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data. In Section 3 we
discuss our econometric approach and present the basic results. Section 4 presents our IV
results. Section 5 discusses potential interpretations for these results. Motivated by these
interpretations, Section 6 investigates the longer-run relationship between income and
democracy, and Section 7 looks at the historical determinants of economic and political
6In passing, we also show that income per capita does not appear to have a causal eﬀect when we look
separately at transitions to and from democracy, contrary to the ﬁndings in Przeworski et al. (2000).
Since we do not have space in this paper, we leave a more detailed investigation of transitions to future
work.
4development in the sample of former European colonies. Section 8 looks at the eﬀect of
crises on democracy. Section 9 concludes. The Appendix contains some additional results
and further information on the construction of the instruments used in Section 4.
2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We follow much of the existing research in this area in adopting a Schumpeterian deﬁnition
based on a number of institutional conditions.7 Our ﬁrst and main measure of democracy
is the Freedom House Political Rights Index. A country receives the highest score if
political rights come closest to the ideals suggested by a checklist of questions, beginning
with whether there are free and fair elections, whether those who are elected rule, whether
there are competitive parties or other political groupings, whether the opposition plays an
important role and has actual power, and whether minority groups have reasonable self-
government or can participate in the government through informal consensus.8 Following
Barro (1999), we supplement this index with the related variable from Bollen (1990, 2001)
for 1950, 1955, 1960, and 1965. As in Barro (1999), we transform both indices so that
they lie between 0 and 1, with 1 corresponding to the most democratic set of institutions.
The Freedom House index, even when augmented with Bollen’s data, only enables us
to look at the postwar era. The Polity IV dataset, on the other hand, provides informa-
tion for all countries since independence starting in 1800. Both for pre-1950 events and
as a check on our main measure, we also look at the other widely-used measure of democ-
racy, the composite Polity index, which is the diﬀerence between Polity’s Democracy and
Autocracy indices (see Marshall and Jaggers, 2004). The Polity Democracy Index ranges
from 0 to 10 and is derived from coding the competitiveness of political participation, the
openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief exec-
utive. The Polity Autocracy Index also ranges from 0 to 10 and is constructed in a similar
way to the democracy score based on scoring countries according to competitiveness of
political participation, the regulation of participation, the openness and competitiveness
of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive. To facilitate compari-
7Schumpeter (1950, p. 250) argued that democracy was: “the institutional arrangement for arriving
at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle
for the people’s vote.”
8The main checklist includes 3 questions on the electoral process, 4 questions on the extent of political
pluralism and participation, and 3 questions on the functioning of government. For each checklist question,
0 to 4 points are added, depending on the comparative rights and liberties present (0 represents the least,
4 represents the most) and these scores are combined to form the index. See Freedom House (2004),
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm
5son with the Freedom House score, we also normalize the composite Polity index to lie
between 0 and 1.
Using the Freedom House and the Polity data, we construct ﬁve-yearly, ten-yearly,
and annual panels. For the ﬁve-year panels, we take the observation every ﬁfth year.
We prefer this procedure to averaging the ﬁve-yearly data, since averaging introduces
additional serial correlation, making inference and estimation more diﬃcult (see footnote
12). For the ten-yearly panels, we take the observation every tenth year for similar reasons.
For the Freedom House data which begins in 1972, we follow Barro (1999) and assign the
1972 score to 1970 for the purpose of the ﬁve-year and ten-year regressions.
The GDP per capita (in PPP) and savings rate data for the postwar period are from
Heston, Summers, and Atten (2002), and GDP per capita (in constant 1990 dollars) for the
longer sample are from Maddison (2003). The trade-weighted world income instrument is
built using data from International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics (2005).
Other variables we use in the analysis are discussed later (see also Appendix Table A1 for
detailed data deﬁnitions and sources).
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the key variables both for the whole world
and for former European colonies, the sample we focus on for some of the historical
regressions. It shows that there is signiﬁc a n tv a r i a t i o ni na l lt h ev a r i a b l e sf o rb o t ht h e
entire sample and the former colonies sample. Countries in the former colonies sample are
somewhat less democratic and substantially (about 30 percent) poorer than the average
country in the whole sample.
3M a i n R e s u l t s
3.1 Basic Speciﬁcations and Interpretation
Our basic regression model is:
dit = αdit−1 + γyit−1 + x
0
it−1β + µt + δi + uit, (1)
where dit is the democracy score of country i in period t. The lagged value of this variable
on the right hand side is included to capture persistence in democracy and also potentially
mean-reverting dynamics (i.e., the tendency of the democracy score to return to some
equilibrium value for the country). The main variable of interest is yit−1, the lagged value
of log income per capita. The parameter γ therefore measures whether income has an
eﬀect on democracy. All other potential covariates are included in the vector xit−1.I n
addition, the δi’s denote a full set of country dummies and the µt’s denote a full set of
6time eﬀects, which capture common shocks to (common trends in) the democracy score
of all countries. uit is an error term, capturing all other omitted factors, with E (uit)=0
for all i and t. The sample period is 1960-2000 and time periods correspond to ﬁve-year
intervals.
The standard regression in the literature, for example, Barro (1999), is pooled OLS,
w h i c hi si d e n t i c a lt o( 1 )e x c e p tf o rt h eo m i s s i o no ft h eﬁxed eﬀects, δi’s. In our framework,
these country dummies capture any time-invariant country characteristic that aﬀect the
equilibrium democracy level.
As is well known, when the true model is given by (1) and the δi’s are correlated with
yit−1 or xit−1, then pooled OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent. More speciﬁcally,
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it−1 refers to the jth component of the vector xit−1,a n d
covariances refer the population covariances). In contrast, even when these covariances are







for all j (as T →∞ , see below). This structure of correlation is particularly relevant in
the context of the relationship between income and democracy because of the possibility
of underlying political and social forces shaping both equilibrium political institutions and
the potential for economic growth. Nevertheless, there should be no presumption that
ﬁxed eﬀects regressions will necessarily estimate the causal eﬀect of income on democracy.
To illustrate this point and as a preparation for the discussion in Section 5, consider a
simpliﬁed version of (1), without the lagged dependent variable and the other covariates
and with contemporaneous income per capita on the right hand side. Let us also add
a n o t h e re r r o rc o m p o n e n t ,ηd
it, which admits a unit root, such that:






































it capture factors aﬀecting the evolution of democracy and income
across countries. As before, the parameter γ represents the causal eﬀect of income
on democracy. Denote the variance of υ
y
i by σ2
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ine that we have data for two time periods. Then the probability limit of the ﬁxed eﬀects
estimator ˆ γ
FE in a panel with only two periods is:
plimˆ γ



































where the second equality uses the assumptions on the ui’s and the υi’s together with the
deﬁnitions in (2) and (3).




it are orthogonal, i.e., if there are no correlated shocks inﬂuencing the







> 0 so that
such shocks are positively correlated, the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator will be biased upwards
and will provide an upper bound on the causal eﬀect of income on democracy.
In addition to the conceptual issues, there is also an econometric problem involved in
the estimation of (1). The regressor dit−1 is mechanically correlated with uis for s<t ,
so the standard ﬁxed eﬀect estimator is not consistent (e.g., Wooldridge, 2002, chapter
11). However, it can be shown that the ﬁxed eﬀects OLS estimator becomes consistent
as the number of time periods in the sample increases (i.e., as T →∞ ). We discuss and
implement a number of strategies to deal with this problem below.
3.2 Results
Table 2 uses the Freedom House data and Table 3 uses the Polity data, in both cases
for our entire (base) sample, over the period 1960-2000. All standard errors in the pa-
per (unless indicated otherwise) are robust against arbitrary heteroscedasticity in the
variance-covariance matrix, and allow for clustering at the country level.9
We start with a column showing the most parsimonious pooled OLS regression of
the democracy score on its (ﬁve-year) lag and log income per capita. Lagged democracy
is highly signiﬁcant, and shows a considerable degree of persistence (mean reversion) in
democracy. Log income per capita is also signiﬁcant and illustrates the well-documented
positive relationship between income and democracy. Though statistically signiﬁcant, the
9Clustering is a simple strategy to correct the standard errors for potential correlation across obser-
vations both over time and within the same time period. See for example Moulton (1986) or Bertrand,
Duﬂo and Mullainathan (2004). The heteroscedasticity correction takes care of fact that the democracy
index takes discrete values.
8eﬀect of income is quantitatively small. For example, the coeﬃcient of 0.072 (standard
error = 0.010) in column 1 of Table 2 implies that a 10 percent increase in GDP per capita
is associated with an increase in the Freedom House score of less than 0.007, which is very
small (for comparison, the gap between the United States and Colombia today is 0.5). If
this pooled cross-section regression identiﬁed the causal eﬀect of income on democracy,
then the long-run eﬀect would be larger than this, because the lag of democracy on the
right hand side would be increasing over time, causing a further increase in the democracy
score. Since lagged democracy has a coeﬃcient of 0.706, the long-run eﬀect of a 10%
increase in GDP per capita would be 0.007/(1-0.706)≈0.024, which is still quantitatively
small.
The remainder of Table 2 presents our basic results with ﬁxed eﬀects. Column 2
shows that the relationship between income and democracy disappears once ﬁxed eﬀects
are included. Now the estimate of γ is 0.010 with a standard error of 0.035, which makes
it highly insigniﬁcant. With the Polity data in Table 3, the estimates have in fact the
wrong (negative) sign, -0.006 (standard error=0.039).
One might be worried that the lack of relationship in the ﬁxed eﬀects regressions is
a consequence of the imprecision of the estimates resulting from the inclusion of ﬁxed
eﬀects. This does not seem to be the case. Although, as pointed out above, the pooled
OLS estimate of γ is quantitatively small, the two standard error bands of the ﬁxed
eﬀects estimates almost exclude it. More speciﬁcally, with the Freedom House estimate,
two standard error bands exclude short-run eﬀects greater than 0.008 and long-run eﬀects
greater than 0.013 on the democracy index (the implied long-run eﬀect of 0.024 in the
pooled cross-sectional regression is comfortably outside this interval because the coeﬃcient
on lagged democracy is smaller with ﬁxed eﬀects).
That these results are not driven by some econometric problems or some unusual
feature of the data is further shown in Figures 1 and 2 above, which plot the change in
the Freedom House and Polity score for each country between 1970 and 1995 against the
change in GDP per capita over the same period. These scatterplots correspond to the
estimation of the ﬁxed eﬀects equation (1) with contemporaneous income as the right-
hand side regressor, without any covariates and using only two data points, 1970 and
1995.10 They show clearly that there is no strong relationship between income growth
and changes in democracy over this period.
10These two dates are chosen to maximize sample size. The regression of the change in Freedom House
score between 1970 and 1995 on change in log income per capita between 1970 and 1995 yields a coeﬃcient
of 0.032, with a standard error of 0.058, while the same regression with Polity data gives a coeﬃcient
estimate of -0.024, with a standard error of 0.063.
9These initial results show that once we allow for ﬁxed eﬀects, per capita income is not
a major determinant of democracy. The remaining columns of the tables consider alter-
native estimation strategies to deal with the potential biases introduced by the presence
of the lagged dependent variable discussed above.
Our ﬁrst strategy, adopted in column 3, is to use the methodology proposed by An-
derson and Hsiao (1982), which is to time diﬀerence equation (1), to obtain
∆dit = α∆dit−1 + γ∆yit−1 + ∆x
0
it−1β + ∆µt + ∆uit, (4)
where the ﬁxed country eﬀects are removed by time diﬀerencing. Although equation
(4) cannot be estimated consistently by OLS, in the absence of serial correlation in the
original residual, uit (i.e., no second order serial correlation in ∆uit), dit−2 is uncorrelated
with ∆uit, so can be used as instrument for ∆dit−1 to obtain consistent estimates and
similarly, yit−2 is used as an instrument for ∆yit−1.W eﬁnd that this procedure leads to
negative estimates (e.g., -0.104, standard error = 0.107 with the Freedom House data),
and shows no evidence of a positive eﬀect of income on democracy.
Although the instrumental variable estimator of Anderson and Hsiao (1982) leads to
consistent estimates, it is not eﬃcient, since, under the assumption of no further serial
correlation in uit,n o to n l ydit−2, but all further lags of dit are uncorrelated with ∆uit,
and can also be used as additional instruments. Arellano and Bond (1991) develop a
Generalized Method-of-Moments (GMM) estimator using all of these moment conditions.
When all these moment conditions are valid, this GMM estimator is more eﬃcient than
the Anderson and Hsiao’s (1982) estimator. We use this GMM estimator in column 4.
The coeﬃcients are now even more negative and more precisely estimated, for example
-0.129 (standard error = 0.076).11 With this estimate, the two standard error bands
now comfortably exclude the corresponding OLS estimate of γ (which, recall, was 0.072).
In addition, the presence of multiple instruments in the GMM procedure allows us to
investigate whether the assumption of no serial correlation in uit can be rejected and
also to test for overidentifying restrictions. With the Freedom House data, the AR(2)
test and the Hansen J test indicate that there is no further serial correlation and the
overidentifying restrictions are not rejected.12
11In addition, Arellano and Bover (1995) also use time-diﬀerenced instruments for the level equation,
(1). Nevertheless, these instruments would only be valid if the time-diﬀerenced instruments are orthogonal
to the ﬁxed eﬀect. Since this is not appealing in this context (e.g., ﬁve-year income growth is unlikely to
be orthogonal to the democracy country ﬁxed eﬀect), we do not include these additional instruments.
12We also checked the results with ﬁve-year averaged data rather than our data set which uses only
the democracy information every ﬁfth year. The results are very similar, but in this case, the AR(2) test
shows evidence for additional serial correlation, which is not surprising given the serial correlation that
averaging introduces. This motivates our reliance on the ﬁve-yearly or annual data sets.
10With the Polity data, both the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and Arellano and Bond
(1991) procedures lead to more negative (and statistically signiﬁcant) estimates. However,
in this case, though there continues to be no serial correlation in uit,t h eo v e r i d e n t i ﬁcation
test is rejected, so we need to be more cautious in interpreting the results with the Polity
data.
Column 5 shows a simpler speciﬁcation in which lagged democracy is dropped. With
either the Freedom House or Polity measure of democracy there is again no evidence
of a signiﬁcant eﬀect of income on democracy, and in this case, the corresponding OLS
estimate is easily outside the two standard error bands (the OLS estimate without lagged
democracy, which is not shown in the table, is 0.235 with a standard error of 0.012).
Column 6 estimates (1) with OLS using annual observations. This is useful since the
ﬁxed eﬀect OLS estimator becomes consistent as the number of observations becomes
large. With annual observations, we have a reasonably large time dimension. However,
estimating the same model on annual data with a single lag would induce signiﬁcant
serial correlation (since our results so far indicate that ﬁve-year lags of democracy predict
changes in democracy). For this reason, we now include ﬁve lags of both democracy and
log GDP per capita in these annual regressions. The table reports the p value of an F-test
for the joint signiﬁcance of these variables. The results show no evidence of a signiﬁcant
positive eﬀect of income on democracy (while democracy is strongly predicted by its lags,
as was the case in earlier columns).
Finally, columns 7 and 8 present regressions using a dataset consisting of ten-year
observations. This is useful to investigate whether the relationship between income and
democracy will be stronger with lower-frequency data. The results are similar to those
with ﬁve-year observations and to the patterns in Figures 1 and 2, which show no evidence
of a positive association between changes in income and democracy between 1970 and
1995.
Overall, the inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects proxying for time-invariant country speciﬁcc h a r -
acteristics removes the cross-country correlation between income and democracy. These
results shed considerable doubt on the conventional wisdom that income has a strong
causal eﬀect on democracy.
3.3 Robustness
Table 4 investigates the robustness of these results in alternative samples. To save space,
we only report the robustness checks for the Freedom House data (the results with Polity
are similar and are available upon request). Columns 1-3 show the regressions correspond-
11ing to columns 2, 4 and 6 of Table 2 for a balanced sample of countries from 1970 to 2000.
This is useful to check whether entry and exit of countries from the base sample of Tables
2a n d3m i g h tb ea ﬀecting the results. All three columns provide very similar results.
For example, using the balanced sample of Freedom House data and the ﬁxed eﬀects OLS
speciﬁcation, the estimate of γ is -0.031 (standard error= 0 .049), and the two standard
error bands now exclude the OLS estimate.
Columns 4-6 exclude sub-Saharan Africa, where many countries became democratic
immediately after independence and later lapsed into nondemocracy. The results in this
sample are also similar and show no evidence of a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of income on
democracy in any of the speciﬁcations. Columns 7-12 report regressions excluding Muslim
countries and former socialist countries, again with very similar results.
Table 5 investigates the inﬂuence of various covariates on the relationship between
income and democracy. To save space, we again report results only with the Freedom
House data. We start with the pooled OLS regressions for comparison. Columns 1-3
includes log population and age structure, and columns 4-6 add education. Columns
7-9 include the full set of covariates from Barro’s (1999) baseline speciﬁcation.13 In all
cases, there is a positive and signiﬁcant estimate of γ in the pooled cross section, which
is smaller than the baseline estimate in column 1 of Table 2. The rest of the table
shows that the presence of these covariates does not aﬀect the (lack of) relationship
between income and democracy when ﬁxed eﬀects are included. Age structure variables
are signiﬁcant in the speciﬁcation that excludes education, but not when education is
included. Education is itself insigniﬁcant with a negative coeﬃcient. The causal eﬀect of
education on democracy, which is the other basic tenet of the modernization hypothesis,
is therefore also not robust to controlling for country ﬁxed eﬀects. We investigate this
issue in greater detail in Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2005).
In addition, in regressions not reported here, we checked for non-linear and non-
monotonic eﬀects of income on democracy and for potential non-linear interactions be-
tween income and other variables, and found no evidence of such relationships.14
13Age structure variables are from United Nations Population Division (2003) and include median age
and variables corresponding to the fraction of the population in the following four age groups: 0-15, 15-30,
30-45, and 45-60. Total population is from World Bank (2002). In our regressions we measure education
as total years of schooling in the population aged 25 and above. In columns where we add covariates
from Barro (1999), we follow Barro’s strategy by measuring education as primary years of schooling in
the population aged 25 and above. Both education variables are from Barro and Lee (2000). Additional
covariates from Barro (1999)’s regression are urbanization rate, male-female education gap, and a dummy
for major oil producer (used in the pooled cross-section only). For detailed deﬁnitions and sources see
Appendix Table A1.
14The only subsample where we ﬁnd a positive association between income per capita and democracy
124 Instrumental Variable Estimates
As discussed above, ﬁxed eﬀects estimators do not necessarily identify the causal eﬀect of
income on democracy. The estimation of such causal eﬀects requires us to exploit a source
of exogenous variation. While we do not have an ideal source of exogenous variation, there
are two promising potential instruments and we now present IV results using these.
4.1 The Savings Rate Instrument
The ﬁrst instrument is the savings rate in the previous ﬁve-year period, denoted by sit.













w h e r ea l lt h ev a r i a b l e sa r et h es a m ea sd e ﬁned above, and the only excluded instrument
is sit−2.T h ei d e n t i ﬁcation restriction is that Cov(sit−2,u it | xit−1,µ t,δi)=0 ,w h e r euit is
the residual error term in the second-stage regression, (1).
We naturally expect the savings rate to inﬂuence income in the future. What about
excludability? While we do not have a precise theory suggesting that the savings rate
should have no direct eﬀect on democracy, it seems plausible to expect that changes in
the savings rate over periods of 5-10 years should have no direct eﬀect on the culture of
democracy, the structure of political institutions or the nature of political conﬂict within
society.
Nevertheless, there are a number of channels through which savings rates could be
correlated with the error term in the second-stage equation, uit. First, the savings rate
itself might be inﬂuenced by the current political regime, for example, dit−2,a n dc o u l db e
correlated with uit if all the necessary lags of democracy are not included in the system.
Second, the savings rate could be correlated with changes in the distribution of income or
composition of assets, which might have direct eﬀects on political equilibria. Below, we
provide evidence that these concerns are unlikely to be important in practice.
With these caveats in mind, Table 6 looks at the eﬀect of GDP per capita on democracy
in IV regressions using past savings rates as instruments and the Freedom House data
(results using Polity data are in Appendix Table A2 and are similar). The savings rate
is deﬁned as nominal income minus consumption minus government expenditure divided
conditional on ﬁxed eﬀects is the postwar sample with 18 West European countries. However, this
relationship holds only with the Freedom House data, and not with the Polity data, and also disappears
when we look at a longer sample than the postwar period alone. Details are available upon request.
13by nominal income.15
We report a number of diﬀerent speciﬁcations, with or without a lag of democracy,
a n dw i t ho rw i t h o u tG M M .T h eﬁrst three columns show the OLS estimates in the pooled
cross section, the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates without lagged democracy on the right hand side,
and the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates with lagged democracy on the right hand side. Without
ﬁxed eﬀects, there is a strong association between income per capita and democracy
(the relationship in column 1 is stronger than before because it does not include lagged
democracy on the right hand side). With ﬁxed eﬀects, this relationship is no longer
present. The remaining columns look at IV speciﬁcations, and the bottom panel shows
the corresponding ﬁrst stages.
Column 4 shows a strong ﬁrst-stage relationship between income and the savings rate,
with a t-statistic of almost 5. The 2SLS estimate of the eﬀect of income per capita on
democracy is -0.035 (standard error = 0.094). Column 5 adds lagged democracy on the
right hand side. The ﬁrst stage is very similar, and now the estimate of γ is -0.020
(standard error = 0.081). Column 6 uses the GMM procedure, again with the savings
rate as the excluded instrument for income. Now the estimate of γ is relatively large and
negative, and signiﬁcant at 5%. These results, therefore, show no evidence of a positive
causal eﬀect of income on democracy.
The remaining columns investigate the robustness of this ﬁnding and the plausibility
of our exclusion restriction. Column 7 shows a very similar estimate when sub-Saharan
African countries are excluded. Column 8 adds labor share as an additional regressor,
to check whether a potential correlation between the savings rate and inequality might
be responsible for our results.16 The ﬁrst stage shows no signiﬁcant eﬀect of labor share
on income per capita, and the 2SLS estimate of γ is similar to the estimate without the
labor share. Column 9 includes further lags of democracy to check whether systematic
diﬀerences in savings rates between democracies and dictatorships might have an eﬀect on
the results. The estimate of γ is similar to before and, if anything, a little more negative in
this case. Finally, column 10 adds a further lag of the savings rate as an instrument. This
is useful since it enables a test of the overidentifying restriction (namely, a test of whether
the savings rate at t-3 is a valid instrument conditional on the savings rate at t-2 being
a valid instrument). The 2SLS estimate of γ is again similar and the overidentiﬁcation
15We calculate savings using nominal, not PPP, numbers from the Penn World Tables. The ﬁrst stage
is weaker and the second stage has a larger standard error if we use PPP data. The ﬁrst and second
results are similar if we use an “investment rate” which is this measure of savings minus net exports.
16This is the labor share of gross value added from Rodrik (1999). We use these data rather than the
standard Gini indices, because they are available for a larger sample of countries. The results with Gini
coeﬃcients are very similar and are available upon request.
14restriction is accepted comfortably (the χ2-statistic for a Hausman, 1978, test takes the
value of 0.00, which is accepted at the p-value of 1.00).
4.2 The Trade-Weighted World Income Instrument
Our second instrument exploits the existence of trade relationships across countries. To
develop this instrument, let Ω =[ ωij]i,j denote the N × N matrix of (time-invariant)
trade shares between countries in our sample, where N is the total number of countries.
Namely, ωij i st h es h a r eo ft r a d eb e t w e e nc o u n t r yi and country j in the GDP of country i.
In practice, we use two measures of Ω.T h eﬁrst is actual trade shares between 1980-1989
(which is chosen to maximize coverage). The second is a measure of predicted average
trade shares from a standard gravity equation used in Frankel and Romer (1999). The
Appendix provides details on data sources and construction.
The transmission of business cycles from one country to another through trade (e.g.,
Baxter, 1995, Kraay and Ventura, 2001) implies that we can think of a statistical model




ωijYjt−1 + εit−1,( 6 )
for all i =1 ,...,N,w h e r eYit−1 denotes log income, so yit−1 = Yit−1 − Pit−1 where Pit−1 is
the log population of i at t−1. The parameter ζ measures the eﬀect of the trade-weighted
w o r l di n c o m eo nt h ei n c o m eo fe a c hc o u n t r y .
G i v e ne q u a t i o n( 6 ) ,t h ei d e n t i ﬁcation problem in the estimation of (1) can be restated
as follows: the error term εit−1 in (6) is potentially correlated with uit in equation (1),
and if so, the estimates of the eﬀect of income on democracy, γ, will be inconsistent. The
idea of the approach in this section is to purge Yit−1, and hence yit−1,f r o mεit−1 to achieve
consistent estimation of γ. For this purpose, we construct




to use as an instrument for yit−1.H e r eb Yit−1 is a weighted sum of world income for each
country, with weights varying across countries depending on their trade pattern. Given
























15where the parameter πF corresponds to ζ˜ πF (we do not need separate estimates of ζ and
˜ πF). The identiﬁcation assumption for this strategy is for b Yit−1 to be orthogonal to uit.
As u ﬃcient condition for this is that Yjt−1 be orthogonal to uit for all j 6= i.
There are two problems with this strategy, however. First, there may be “economic”
reasons for this identiﬁcation assumption to be violated. For example, Yjt−1 may be
correlated with democracy in country j at time t, djt,w h i c hm a yi n ﬂuence dit through
other, political, social or cultural channels. Although we have no way of ruling this
out a priori, we test for this in our empirical speciﬁcations below by controlling for the
direct eﬀect of the democracy of trading partners, and ﬁnd no evidence to support such
a channel.
Second, there is an econometric problem, arising from the general equilibrium nature
of equation (6).17 Since this equation also applies for country j, the disturbance term εit−1,
which determines Yit−1, will be correlated with Yjt−1, inducing a correlation between Yjt−1
and εit−1, and thus between b Yit−1 and εit−1. To see this, let Yt−1 be the N × 1 vector of
log incomes, and let εt−1 be the N × 1 vector of errors in (6). Then



















, are not neces-
sarily zero, εit−1 will be mechanically correlated with b Yit−1. If we had a consistent estima-
tor for ζ, ˆ ζ (i.e., with plimˆ ζ = ζ), then by implication we would also have plimˆ εt−1 = εt−1
(where the probability limit applies as N →∞ ). This would enable us to construct an
adjusted instrument b Y ADJ
it−1 , such that
b Y
ADJ
it−1 = b Yit−1 −
∙∙³





ˆ εit−1.( 9 )
Using the Continuous Mapping Theorem (see, for example, van der Vaart, 1998, Theorem
2.3), b Y ADJ
it−1 would be uncorrelated with εit−1. In other words, this transformation would
remove the indirect eﬀect of εit−1 on yit−1 working through the general equilibrium inter-
actions across countries as well as the direct eﬀect in (6). Obtaining a consistent estimate
of ζ is not straightforward, however.18 Here we take a number of approaches to deal with
this problem. First, under some regularity conditions, the problem disappears as N →∞ ,
so appealing to asymptotics on the number of countries, our ﬁrst strategy is to ignore this
17We refer to this as “general equilibrium”, since it would result from an equilibrium model of cross-
country income determination as in Baxter (1995), Kraay and Ventura (2001), or Acemoglu and Ventura
(2002).
18This problem is investigated in current work, Acemoglu, Kursteiner and Yared (2005).
16problem and use (7). Our second strategy is to estimate ζ and perform the adjustment in
(9) (more details on this are given in the Appendix). Our third strategy is to construct
(7) with lagged values of Yjt−1, which also removes the source of correlation between b Yjt−1
and uit in equation (1) if εit−1’s are serially uncorrelated. All three strategies give very
similar results.
The main results using the Freedom House data are presented in Table 7 (results using
the Polity data are in Appendix Table A2). In the bottom panel we report the ﬁrst stage.
Similar to Table 6, the ﬁrst three columns report OLS regressions with and without ﬁxed
eﬀects, and the patterns are similar to those presented before. Column 4 shows our basic
2SLS estimate with the trade-weighted instrument. The instrument is constructed as in
(7) using the actual average trade shares between 1980 and 1989. The bottom panel shows
as t r o n gﬁrst-stage relationship with a t-statistic of almost 5. The 2SLS estimate of γ is
-0.213 (standard error= 0.150). When we add lag democracy in column 5, the estimate
is slightly less negative and more precise, -0.120 (standard error = 0.105), and becomes a
little more precise with GMM in column 6, -0.133 (standard error = 0.077).
Column 7 shows a similar, though slightly less precise, estimate without sub-Saharan
Africa. Column 8 investigates whether the democracy of trading partners might have
an eﬀect, inﬂuencing inference with this instrumental variable. We construct a world
democracy index, ˜ dit using the same trade shares as in equation (7), and include this
both in the ﬁrst and second stages. This democracy index, ˜ dit, also varies across countries
because of the diﬀerences in weights. We ﬁnd that ˜ dit has no eﬀect either in the ﬁrst or
the second stages, consistent with our identiﬁcation assumption that b Yit−1 should have no
eﬀect on democracy in country i except through its inﬂuence on yit−1.
Column 9 uses b Yit−2 instead of b Yit−1 on the right-hand side of (7) as an alternative
strategy to remove the mechanical correlation between b Yit−1 and εit−1. Finally, column 10
performs an overidentiﬁcation test similar to that in column 10 in Table 6 by including
both b Yit−1 and b Yit−2. The estimate of γ is similar to the baseline estimate in column 4,
and the overidentifying restriction that the twice-lagged instrument is valid conditional on
the ﬁrst instrument being valid is easily accepted (the χ2-statistic for a Hausman, 1978,
test takes the value of 0.14, which is accepted at the p-value of 1.00).
Table 8 presents further robustness checks. Columns 1-3 exclude Singapore, which is
an outlier in the ﬁrst stage. The ﬁrst-stage relationship is weaker but still signiﬁcant,
and the second-stage coeﬃcient remains negative and insigniﬁcant. Columns 4-6 adjust
b Yit−1 using (9), which has little eﬀect on the estimates. Columns 7-9 present speciﬁcations
using the gravity equation to construct Ω, which yield similar results to those in Table 7.
17Overall, our two IV strategies give results consistent with the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates
and indicate that there is no evidence for a strong causal eﬀect of income on democracy.
5 Interpretation
The above results raise the following question: if there is no causal eﬀect of income on
democracy, what explains the strong cross-sectional relationship between the two vari-
ables? This strong cross-country relationship is shown in Figure 3 using the Freedom
House data and is the source of the positive and signiﬁcant estimates in the pooled cross-
sectional regressions.
Two hypotheses naturally present themselves.
5.1 Hypothesis 1: Long Lags
The ﬁrst possibility is that there is a causal eﬀect of income on democracy, but it works
with such long and variable lags that it is impossible to detect this causal channel in the
postwar data. Although the issue of lags is not discussed explicitly in Lipset (1959), this is
a natural extension of his thesis, since it may take a long time for a culture of democracy
to emerge, or because political institutions change only slowly.
According to this hypothesis, we need to look at longer time spans. The key question
is what the right horizon should be. Figures 1 and 2 show that there is no eﬀect when we
look at a 25-year period (1970-95) during the recent past. We believe that any reasonable
version of this hypothesis should predict some eﬀe c tw h e nw el o o ka ta5 0 - y e a rh o r i z o n
or perhaps, at the longest, a 100-year horizon.
We next investigate the longer-run relationship between income and democracy. But
before doing this, we discuss an alternative explanation for our results.
5.2 Hypothesis 2: Divergent Development Paths
The second possible explanation, which we ﬁnd more appealing than hypothesis 1, is that
the positive cross-sectional relationship reﬂects relatively time-invariant, historical factors
that have inﬂuenced the economic and political development path of societies. There are
reasons to expect that economic and political development processes should be related.
For example, economic institutions encouraging economic growth are unlikely to develop
and endure in societies where political power is in the hands of a small elite, who can
exercise it to further their interests, even if this is at the cost of aggregate economic
growth.
18Moreover, events during certain critical junctures may have large and persistent ef-
fects on income and democracy because of their inﬂuence on the economic and political
development paths of societies. Consequently, part of the variation in both prosperity and
political institutions that we observe today may be the result of some societies having em-
barked on a path of development based on relatively democratic political and economic
institutions encouraging growth, while other societies ended up with repressive regimes
controlled by narrow elites, which engendered neither prosperity nor democracy.
The contrast between European colonies in Latin America, such as Peru and Bolivia,
and the North American colonies illustrates the potential eﬀects of key events during
critical junctures. All of these societies were colonized by Europeans after 1492, but the
exact colonization strategy diﬀered a great deal. While smallholder societies, with the
majority of the population enjoying access to land, secure property rights, and economic
opportunities soon developed in the North American colonies, a highly coercive society,
based on the exploitation and enslavement of the indigenous peoples, emerged in Peru and
Bolivia (potential reasons for these diﬀerences in the colonization experience are discussed
in Section 7). Moreover, these early diﬀerences in economic and political institutions have
shown a considerable degree of persistence. While the United States and Canada have
remained democratic and grown rapidly over the past 300 years, the political and economic
record of Peru and Bolivia has been much more checkered. Hypothesis 2 implies that to
understand the relationship between income and democracy, we need to look at the events
and factors inﬂuencing institutional equilibria at critical junctures, in this case during the
early phases of colonialism.
5.3 Implications and Discussion
Which of these two hypotheses is closer to the truth? We are unable to answer this
question deﬁnitively at the moment, but two empirical exercises are informative. The ﬁrst
strategy is to look at the longer-run relationship between income and democracy, while
the second strategy is to look directly at potential determinants of divergent historical
development paths, which we turn to in Section 7.
Both hypotheses suggest that the longer-run relationship should be more positive, but
for very diﬀerent reasons, and potentially at very diﬀerent horizons. In particular, accord-
ing to hypothesis 2, the source of the correlation is the events during critical junctures,
so the time interval should include dates spanning these junctures. In the context of
the modern economic and political development experience, this means that the positive
long-run relationship should emerge (or become more pronounced) in a data set covering
19the era before the 19th century rather than a window of 50 or 100 years during the recent
past.
To clarify the main issues, let us return to the statistical model in equations (2) and (3).
In the context of these equations, our emphasis on political and economic development




it at some t = T∗, which will then have a persistent eﬀect on democracy and prosperity
b e c a u s eo ft h eu n i tr o o ti nηd
it and η
y
it (the implicit assumption that these shocks happen
at some common date t = T∗ for all countries is only for simplicity).
Now imagine we have data for two time periods again, t = T − S and t = T.T i m e -
diﬀerencing equations (2) and (3), we obtain:
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T∗ be positive and large, capturing the importance of a major event
aﬀecting both economic and political outcomes at this critical juncture. To contrast with








∼T∗ for t 6= T∗, which we presume to be small and
positive, and in particular much smaller than σ2








for all i and k 6=0 . Now consider the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator ˆ γ
FE
S ,w h e r et h et i m es p a ni s
given by S. Standard arguments imply that the probability limit of this estimator using
these two data points is:
plimˆ γ
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if T∗ ∈ [T − S,T]
,
where the second equality exploits the fact that υi’s and ui’s are serially uncorrelated.
Equation (11) has three important implications. First, as S increases, the bias of the
ﬁxed eﬀects estimator and the predicted positive relationship between income and democ-
racy increases (and as S becomes smaller, plimˆ γ
FE
S approaches γ). This is because, as S
increases, the non-persistent shocks to income, which are uncorrelated with democracy,
become less important relative to the component correlated with democracy, υ
y
it,a n d t h i s
20reduces the denominator through the term 2σ2
uy/S. Second, and more important, when
t h et i m es p a nf r o mt = T − S to t = T includes the critical juncture T∗,w ee x p e c ta
stronger positive relationship between income and democracy, since σ2
T∗ −σ2
∼T∗ > 0.T h i s
is relevant in interpreting why we see a positive relationship between these two variables
during some horizons but not others. Finally, under hypothesis 2, the bias of (11) will
be reduced if we are able to control variables that proxy for or are correlated with the
common component in υd
iT∗ and υ
y
iT∗ (in practice, historical determinants of divergent
development paths).
6 Democracy and Income in the Long Run
6.1 Democracy and Income Over the past 160 Years
Although historical data are typically less reliable than postwar data, the Polity IV dataset
extends back to the beginning of the 19th century (for countries that were then indepen-
dent), and Maddison (2003) gives estimates of income for many countries from around
1820. Using these data, we construct a 5-yearly and a 10-yearly dataset between 1840 and
1940. Countries that gained and maintained independence before 1900 and have more
than 5 observations in the 1840 to 1940 data period are included in this dataset. The
result is an unbalanced panel with a country entering when there are observations from
both Polity and Maddison.19
Table 9, Panel A reports some basic regressions with this dataset. In column 1,
pooled cross-sectional OLS regressions again show the conventional result, with income
per capita having a positive and signiﬁcant sign. Column 2 adds ﬁxed eﬀects and similar
to our results above, the coeﬃcient estimate on income per capita becomes insigniﬁcant.
Column 3 uses GMM and column 4 excludes lagged democracy, again with similarly
insigniﬁcant results.
Columns 5 and 6 repeat the regressions from columns 2 and 3 using ten-year instead of
ﬁve-year intervals. We use this strategy to check whether the lack of a signiﬁcant eﬀect of
income on democracy is caused by measurement error or country noise in democracy over
the ﬁve-year horizon, and also to investigate whether there could be an eﬀect of income
on democracy at lower frequencies than over 5 years. The basic results are identical to
those in the ﬁrst four columns of the table.
19The countries in this section are Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China,
Colombia, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, México, Netherlands, Norway,
Perú, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.
21The conclusion from this investigation is that the pre-1940 evolution of countries in
Europe and Latin America is similar to the results from the post-1960 sample. Once we
control for ﬁxed eﬀects, there is no signiﬁcant relationship between income per capita and
democracy.
We further investigate these ideas in Panels B and C by taking the same sample of
countries and extending the dataset to 2000 (thus constructing a 160-year panel with 28
countries). Without ﬁxed eﬀects, higher per capita income is again strongly associated
with greater democracy. In this 160-year sample, there is also a positive coeﬃcient on
log GDP per capita when we control for ﬁxed eﬀects, though this relationship is not
robust to estimation via GMM in the ﬁve-year sample. Figure 4 depicts the change in the
Polity composite index versus the change in log GDP per capita between 1870 and 1995
(dates chosen to maximize sample size), and shows a positive but insigniﬁcant relationship
between these dates.20
Further investigation suggests that the results in the 1840-2000 panel are partly driven
by one country, Venezuela, especially the postwar correlation between income per capita
and democracy in Venezuela.21 Further investigation suggests that the correlation between
the Venezuelan GDP and democracy over the relevant period is related to increases in oil
revenues–not the type of income variation generally thought to promote democratization.
In particular, there is a close association between oil income and democracy in Venezuela,
but not between non-oil income and democracy (details are available upon request). Panel
C therefore repeats the regressions in Panel B without Venezuela. In this case, though
the estimate of the coeﬃcient on income per capita remains positive, it is no longer
statistically signiﬁcant.
6.2 Democracy and Income Over the past 500 Years
Next we push the reasoning in equation (11) further. Our discussion of hypothesis 2
suggests that if we could construct a longer dataset, spanning the critical junctures for
divergent development paths, we should obtain a stronger relationship. Although no
existing dataset spans more than 160 years of political development, there exist rough
estimates of income per capita for almost all areas of the world in 1500. Moreover, we
20The corresponding regression yields the coeﬃcients of 0.076, with a standard error of 0.123. Parallel
with our treatment of the very long run below, we also looked at the relationship over the period 1870-
1995 assigning the lowest Polity score to countries without Polity data. We found only a small and
marginally signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on income in the full sample, and a small and insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient
for former European colonies, which we discuss further below. Details are available upon request.
21In Tables 2-8, Venezuela did not have a disproportionate eﬀect on the results because these regressions
included a considerably larger set of countries than Table 9.
22also have information about the variation in political institutions around the turn of the
16th century. While no country was fully “democratic” according to current deﬁnitions,
there were signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the political institutions of countries around the world
even at this date. In particular, most countries outside Europe were ruled by absolutist
regimes while some European countries had developed certain constraints on the behavior
of their monarchs.
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004b) provide a coding of constraint on the ex-
ecutive for European countries (based on the Polity deﬁnition) going back to 1500 from
various sources. It also appears reasonable to assume that constraint on the executive for
non-European countries and the other components of the Polity index (competitiveness
of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, and competitiveness of polit-
ical participation) both for European and non-European countries should take the lowest
score in 1500. Based on this information, we can construct the Polity Composite index
for 1500 (details available upon request). Combining these data with estimates of income
per capita, we can get a glimpse of the relationship between income and democracy over
this 500-year interval.
This is done in Figure 5 using Maddison’s (2003) estimates of income per capita in
1500.22 The ﬁgure shows a strong positive relationship between changes in democracy
and changes in income for 143 countries (1995 is used as the end date in the plot and in
Table 10 to maximize sample size). This plot corresponds to a ﬁxed eﬀect regression from
1500 to 1995 with only two time periods, of the form:
∆di,1995−1500 = γ0 + γ∆yi,1995−1500 + ∆ui.
This regression is reported in column 1 of Table 10, and yields a large and statistically
signiﬁcant estimate of γ, 0.139 (standard error = 0 .033). Column 2 estimates the same
relationship this time assigning the lowest democracy score to all countries in 1500, and
shows a very similar estimate. The rest of Table 10 will be discussed below.
Overall, the very long-run evidence shows an association between democracy and
income, but this correlation is not present or quite weak when we look at samples of 100
years or so. We interpret this evidence as consistent with hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 1
would have suggested a strong eﬀect even in the 100- or 140-year data sets. In contrast,
22For this exercise, when Maddison (2003) provides estimates for individual countries, we use these
estimates. When he provides estimates for broad geographic areas, we assign this estimate to all countries
now occupying these territories without country-level data. We take into account the cross-correlation
in the right hand side variable by clustering the standard errors at the data aggregation level for each
country.
23hypothesis 2 would suggest the stronger relationship should emerge once we consider
at i m ei n t e r v a ls u ﬃciently long to span the critical junctures leading to the divergent
development paths. In this case, the fact that a strong relationship emerges when we look
at a 500-year period, but not when we only go back to the mid-19th century, is consistent
with this view.
7 Understanding the Fixed Eﬀects
We now directly investigate the potential determinants of divergent development paths.
If we can pinpoint these potential determinants and their inﬂuence on the relationship
between income and democracy, this would be evidence supporting hypothesis 2. More-
over, as suggested in Section 5, if we can directly control for these historical factors or
their proxies, the positive correlation between income and democracy should weaken.
7.1 Divergent Development Paths Among the Colonies
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) document that factors aﬀecting the prof-
itability of diﬀerent institutional structures for European colonizers had a major impact
on early institutions, and on subsequent political and economic development. They em-
p h a s i z et h a tt w of a c t o r sa ﬀecting colonial strategies, and therefore the subsequent devel-
opment paths, were the mortality rate faced by potential European settlers and the popu-
lation density of indigenous peoples before colonization (in practice around 1500). Higher
mortality rates discouraged Europeans from settling, and made an extractive strategy,
associated with coercive and non-participatory institutions, more likely. More densely-
settled areas also discouraged European settlements, and even conditional on settlements,
encouraged the establishment of coercive institutions designed to control the indigenous
population and to transfer resources from them.
We next use these ideas in the sample of former European colonies, where European
intervention created a potentially exogenous source of divergence in political and economic
development paths. We examine the eﬀects of both the density of the indigenous popula-
tion in 1500 (population density in 1500, for short) and of settler mortality.23 We expect
countries with high rates of settler mortality and higher indigenous population density
in 1500 to have experienced greater extraction of resources and repression by Europeans,
23Population density in 1500 is calculated by dividing the historical measures of population from
McEvedy and Jones (1975) by the area of arable land (see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002).
Finally, data on settler mortality are from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), who constructed it
based on research by Philip Curtin and other historians (e.g., Curtin, 1989, 1998, and Gutierrez, 1986).
24and consequently to be less democratic today. However, both population density in 1500
and European settler mortality rates are subject to a large amount of measurement error,
and are only some of the inﬂuences on the ultimate development path. For example, for
various reasons, Europeans opted for extractive institutions in many areas, such as Brazil,
with low population density. Therefore, a direct measure of institutions immediately after
the end of the colonial period is also useful to gauge the eﬀect of the historical conditions
on current outcomes. For this reason, we look at the measure of constraint on the execu-
tive from the Polity IV dataset right at (soon after) independence for each former colony,
measured as the average score during the ﬁrst ten years after independence.24 This is the
closest variable we have to a measure of institutions during colonialism. We normalize
this score to a 0 to 1 scale like democracy, with 1 representing the highest constraint on
the executive.
Finally, we also control for the date of independence. This is useful because constraint
on the executive at diﬀerent dates of independence may mean diﬀerent things, so it is
important to control for the date of independence. In addition and potentially more
important, countries where Europeans settled and developed secure property rights and
more democratic institutions typically gained their independence earlier than colonies
with extractive institutions. Another important eﬀect of the date of independence on
political and economic development might be that former colonies undergo a relatively
lengthy period of instability after independence, adversely aﬀecting both growth prospects
and democracy.
7.2 Historical Variables and Fixed Eﬀects
Figures 6-9 show that the ﬁxed eﬀects in the democracy regressions are closely linked to
the historical determinant and proxies for divergent development paths among the former
European colonies.25 In particular, they show a strong association between the ﬁxed
eﬀects, and respectively, settler mortality rates, the density of the population in 1500,
constraint on the executive at (shortly after) independence, and year of independence.
These ﬁgures suggest that the ﬁxed eﬀects are indeed related to the conditions which
contributed to the divergent development paths of these countries.
24Data on date of independence are from the CIA World Factbook (2004). For detailed data deﬁnitions
and sources see Appendix Table A1. The data on constraint on the executive from Polity begins in 1800
or at the date of independence. In our former colonies sample only one country, the United States became
independent before 1800. The United States broke with Britain in 1776 and was recognized as a new
nation following the Treaty of Paris in 1783. We code the U.S. date of independence as 1800.
25These ﬁxed eﬀects are from the regression for the former colonies sample in column 2 of Table 11.
25Tables 11 further documents this point using regression evidence. The ﬁrst two
columns show the pooled OLS and ﬁxed eﬀects relationship between income and democ-
racy in the sample of former European colonies.26 As in the other samples, there is a
strong cross sectional relationship between income and democracy, but no evidence of a
causal eﬀect with ﬁxed eﬀects in the sample of former European colonies.
The remaining columns of Tables 11 show that when the four proxies for the evolution
of the development path are included in regressions without ﬁxed eﬀects, the inﬂuence of
income per capita on democracy is substantially weakened and in many speciﬁcations, it
disappears. For example, when all four of settler mortality, population density in 1500,
constraint on executive at independence and independence year are included in column 6,
or when only the last three variables are included, there is no longer a signiﬁcant eﬀect of
income per capita on democracy.27 Table A3 in the Appendix shows similar results using
the Polity data set.
These results suggest that the ﬁxed eﬀects, which account for the cross-sectional re-
lationship between income and democracy, are closely related to colonial history in the
sample of former European colonies. As such, they lend support to hypothesis 2, which
emphasizes the importance of divergent economic and political development paths.
7.3 Revisiting the Very Long Run
In the light of these ﬁndings, we now return to the positive relationship in the 500-year
sample shown in Table 10. We have so far argued that this relationship was consistent
with hypothesis 2, since it was precisely during this period that countries embarked upon
divergent development paths. A further check on hypothesis 2 would be that when we
include the historical variables emphasized in the previous section, the 500-year relation-
ship between income and democracy in the former European colonies sample should again
26We adopt the deﬁnition of former European colonies used in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001,
2002), which excludes the Middle Eastern countries that were brieﬂy colonized by European powers during
the 20th century. This deﬁnition is motivated by our interest in former colonies as a sample where the
process of institutional development, in particular during the 19th century and earlier, was shaped by
European intervention (see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002). The results are robust to including
t h eM i d d l eE a s t e r nc o u n t r i e s .
27We also investigated whether other time-invariant characteristics that have been emphasized in the
previous literature, in particular, identity of the colonizer, legal origin, religion or latitude, have explana-
tory power for democracy once the ﬁxed eﬀects are removed in the sample of former colonies. We found
that none of them have any eﬀect on democracy when the historical determinants emphasized in this
section are included in the regressions. Furthermore, we added more lags of democracy on the right hand
side, and constraint on the executive at independence remained signiﬁcant, suggesting that this variable
does not capture some slow dynamics in democracy, but is instead related to the political and economic
development path of the former colonies. Results are available upon request.
26weaken or even disappear. This is investigated in the rest of Table 10.
Column 3 shows a similar relationship between change in income and change in democ-
r a c yt ot h a ts h o w ni nF i g u r e5a n di nc o l u m n1a m o n gt h ef o r m e rE u r o p e a nc o l o n i e s .
The remaining columns show that the positive relationship disappears when we include
the historical variables emphasized in the previous section. For example, in column 7
when all four of population density in 1500, settler mortality, constraint on executive at
independence and independence year are included, the coeﬃcient on ∆y1500,1995 becomes
essentially zero (-0.006, standard error = 0.054) instead of 0.126 in column 3. This is
illustrated in Figure 10 which depicts the relationship between changes in democracy and
changes in income in former colonies conditional on these four historical factors. This
evidence also supports hypothesis 2.
8 Economic Crises and Democracy
Our analysis so far shows that income seems to have little predictive power for the over-
time variation (at the ﬁve- or ten-year frequencies) in democracy in the postwar sample.
In this section, we document that there are some predictable movements in changes in
democracy.
A number of theories, including Haggard and Kaufman (1995) and Acemoglu and
Robinson (2004), emphasize economic crises as events destabilizing both democratic and
nondemocratic regimes, and leading to regime transitions. The overall eﬀect on the level of
democracy is ambiguous, and depends on whether the destabilizing eﬀect on democracies
or nondemocracies is greater.28
We investigate this issue in Table 12. We deﬁne an economic crisis as a sudden and
sharp decline in growth relative to ﬁve years ago. More speciﬁcally, there is an economic
crisis at time t−1 if the change in the ﬁve-yearly average growth rate of GDP per capita
in any year in the ﬁve-year period between t−1 and t−2 is less than a certain threshold
−∆y.29 We choose the threshold ∆y as 3 percent (columns 1 and 2), 4 percent (columns
3 and 4) or 5 percent (columns 5 and 6). These thresholds are motivated by the fact that
28Various empirical papers in the political science literature, for instance Gasiorowski (1995) and Prze-
worski et al. (2000) have investigated the impact of crises on regime transitions. However, this research
has not attempted to control for omitted variables or for the endogeneity of income.
29Recall that the time period, t,r e f e r st oﬁve year intervals. The years s between t−2 and t−1 are s ∈
[5t−10,5t−6]. We denote the forward average ﬁve-year growth rate in year s by ∆˜ ys =
P5
j=1 ∆ys+j/5,
and deﬁne a crisis during year s as occuring if ∆˜ ys − ∆˜ ys−5 < −∆y. This means that we need 15 years
of data on income per capita preceding the democracy observation, and our sample in Table 12 starts in
1965.
27one standard deviation of this variable is equal to 4 percent.
The dependent variable in Panel A is the Freedom House democracy score. The results
in Panel A show that, again contrary to the predictions of modernization theory, economic
crises make democracy more likely. This result at ﬁrst looks paradoxical. How could crises
make democracy more likely?
Panels B and C show why this is so: economic crises have a small, and typically not
statistically signiﬁcant, eﬀect on transitions away from democracy, but a large eﬀect on
transitions away from nondemocracy to democracy. In other words, economic crises cause
dictatorships to fall, thus increasing the likelihood of democracy. To document this, we
take a simple approach and create two variables measuring movements towards and away
from democracy. In particular, equation (1) is modiﬁed as follows:
d
+
it = αdit−1 + γyit−1 + x
0
it−1β + µt + δi + uit (12)
for transitions to democracy and
d
−
it = αdit−1 + γyit−1 + x
0
it−1β + µt + δi + uit (13)
for transitions from democracy, where d
+
it =m a x{dit,d it−1} and d
−
it =m i n{dit,d it−1}.30
This procedure implies that for d
+
it, we only consider upward movements in the democracy
score and ignore declines in democracy, whereas d
−
it only considers deterioration in the
democracy score. A full analysis of democratic transitions is beyond the scope of this
paper. For our purposes here, it is suﬃcient to note that estimation of these equations with
ﬁxed eﬀects (OLS or GMM) ﬁnds no evidence that income per capita has a causal eﬀect
on either transitions to or transitions away from democracy. However, these estimates
suggest that economic crises which enter into x0
it−1 do have an eﬀect on transitions to
democracy.31
Using these deﬁnitions, in Panels B and C, we investigate the relationship between
economic crises and transitions to and away from democracy. The estimates show that
economic crises make dictatorships more likely to transition to democracy, but have a
much smaller eﬀect on transitions away from democracy. These two results combined
together explain why economic crises are found to lead to greater democracy in Panel
A.32
30Although (12) and (13) are non-linear equations, the ﬁxed eﬀects, the δi’s, enter additively and can
be diﬀerenced out to achieve consistent estimation.
31We did not ﬁnd any robust results using this deﬁnition of crises on the 160 year sample discussed in
Section 6.
32A natural question is whether growth accelerations have a similar eﬀect on regime change. A recent
289C o n c l u s i o n
The conventional wisdom in the political economy literature that income per capita has
ac a u s a le ﬀect on democracy. In this paper, we argue that, though income and democ-
racy are positively correlated, there is no evidence of a causal eﬀect. Instead, omitted,
most probably historical, factors appear to have shaped the divergent political and eco-
nomic development paths of various societies, leading to the positive association between
democracy and economic performance. Consequently, regressions that include country
ﬁxed eﬀects and/or instrumental variable regressions show no evidence of a causal eﬀect of
income on democracy. These results shed considerable doubt on the conventional wisdom
b o t hi nt h ea c a d e m i cl i t e r a t u r ea n di nt h ep o p u l a rp r e s st h a ti n c o m ec a u s e sd e m o c r a c y ,
and a general increase in income per capita will bring improvements in institutions.
This result immediately leads to an important question: why are richer countries more
democratic today? We provided evidence that this is likely to be because the political and
economic development paths are interwoven. Some countries appear to have embarked
upon a development path associated with democracy and economic growth, while others
pursued a path based on dictatorship, repression and more limited growth. Consistent
with this, in the sample of former European colonies where we have good measures of
the historical sources of variation in development paths, we showed that the ﬁxed eﬀects
indeed capture the impact of these historical diﬀerences.
In emphasizing the importance of historical development paths, we do not want to
suggest that there is a historical determinism in political institutions. The ﬁxed eﬀects
in the regressions, and the development paths in theory, create a tendency, but many
other factors inﬂuence equilibrium political institutions. In the last section, we showed
how severe economic crises lead to the collapse of dictatorships, making democracy more
likely. The most important area for future research is a further investigation of the
eﬀect of these time-varying and human factors on the evolution of equilibrium political
institutions.
paper by Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2004) emphasizes the importance of growth accelerations.
We also investigated the eﬀect of growth accelerations in a symmetric way to economic crises by creating
a dummy for acceleration if the change in the ﬁve-yearly average growth rate of GDP per capita in any
year between t − 2 and t − 1 is above a certain threshold ∆y (again 3 percent, 4 percent or 5 percent).
None of these speciﬁcations showed any eﬀect of growth accelerations on democracy.
2910 Appendix
This Appendix describes the construction of the trade-weighted world income instrument
used in Section 4. First, we describe the instrument constructed from actual trade shares.
Second, we describe the instrument derived from gravity-predicted trade shares. Finally,
we describe our method of adjusting for the potential bias caused by the general equilib-
rium nature of equation (6).
First, we measure the matrix Ω =[ ωij]i,j using actual trade shares between 1980 and
1989. These dates are chosen to maximize coverage. Bilateral trade data are from from
the International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics (DoT) (2005) CD-ROM.
Let Xijs denote the total trade ﬂow between i and j in year s, meaning the sum of exports
from i to j and exports from j to i in year s. We calculate Xijs for all country pairs in
year s for which both ﬂows from i to j and from j to i are available. These ﬂows can be
measured using either FOB exports from i to j or CIF imports by j from i.W h e nb o t h
are available, we take the average, and otherwise we use whichever measure is available.
All trade data are deﬂated into 1983 US dollars using the US CPI from International
Financial Statistics (2004).
Let Y ∗
is denote the total GDP of country i in year s in 1983 US dollars obtained from
Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002), and Iij be the number of years between 1980 and 1989













where Xiis =0by deﬁnition.
Since we have an unbalanced panel, we construct our instrument deﬁned in (7) as
follows. Deﬁne Ijt−1 = {0,1} as an indicator for Yjt−1 being available in the dataset.
Then











where Yjt−1 is log income as before. The third term in (14) ensures that the sum of
the weights ωij are the same across time for a given country i,a n dt h i sa d j u s t m e n t
term is equal to 1 in a balanced panel. We measure trade-weighted democracy ˜ dit in an
analogous fashion using (14), where we substitute djt for Yjt−1 and let Ijt−1 now represent
an indicator referring to the availability of the variable djt.
Second, we generate an alternate measure of Ω, ΩG, from the following gravity equation
30as in Frankel and Romer (1999):
log(ωij)=β0 + β1I
B
ij + β2Zij + β3I
B
ijZij +  ij,( 1 5 )
where Zij is a vector of country-pair level covariates, IB
ij is a dummy variable which equals
1 if the two countries share a land border, and  ij is an error term where E ( ij)=0 . Zij
includes the following covariates: dummy if i is landlocked, dummy if j is landlocked,
log distance between i and j, log area of i, log area of j, log population of i,a n dl o g
population of j.33 We estimate (15) using OLS. With our estimates of b β0, b β1, b β2,a n db β3,
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where second and third terms of (16) represent a gravity-weighted average of world income
where the sum of the weights is actual trade openness
PN
j=1,j6=i ωij.34
Finally, for the adjustment in (9), we estimate (6) using actual trade shares in a
speciﬁcation which includes a full set of time and country dummies and using the same











This provides us with an estimate of ˆ ζ and ˆ εit−1.W et h e nu s e(9) to create an adjusted
instrument. In inverting the matrix
³
I − ˆ ζΩ
´
,w ed r o pt h eith row and ith column of Ω
whenever ωij is unavailable for any j.
33As in Frankel and Romer (1999), we constrain the coeﬃcients on the two landlocked dummies to
be the same. For this exercise, area is from CIA (2004). Population is the average log population from
1980 to 1989 from WDI (2002). Landlocked, contiguity, and distance are from Glick and Rose (2002).
Detailed results are available upon request.
34Results are similar if the sum of the weights is predicted openness. Results are available upon request.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Freedom House Measure 0.57 0.47 0.78 0.36
of Democracyt (0.36) (0.34) (0.30) (0.30)
Polity Measure  0.57 0.50 0.80 0.36
of Democracyt (0.38) (0.35) (0.30) (0.31)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 8.16 7.85 9.02 7.30
  (Chain Weighted 1996 Prices) (1.02) (0.89) (0.56) (0.53)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 7.92 7.62 8.84 7.08
  (1990 dollars ) (1.05) (0.93) (0.61) (0.55)
Savings Rate t-2 0.17 0.16 0.22 0.11
(0.13) (0.14) (0.10) (0.14)
Trade-Weighted World  11.61 11.09 13.02 10.28
Log GDP t-1 (8.43) (9.30) (9.83) (6.60)
Constraint on the Executive 0.38
   at Independence (0.35)
Independence Year 1911
(65)
Log Population Density in 1500 0.41
(1.60)
Log Settler Mortality 4.75
(1.20)
Observations 945 541 473 472
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Values are averages during sample period, with standard deviations in parentheses. All countries are those for which 
democracy, lag democracy, and lag income in five-year intervals are available at least once during 1960-2000, for the 
Freedom House measure of democracy. A country must be independent for at least 5 years. Column 1 refers to the sample in 
the regression in Table 2, column 1. Column 2 refers to the sample in Table 11 column 1. Columns 3 and 4 split the sample in 
column 1 by the median income (from Penn World Tables 6.1) in the sample of column 1. Freedom House Measure of 
Democracy is the Political Rights Index, augmented following Barro (1999). Polity Measure of Democracy is Democracy 
Index minus Autocracy Index from Polity IV. GDP per capita in 1996 prices with PPP adjustment is from the Penn World 
Tables 6.1; GDP per capita in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars is from Maddison (2003). Nominal Savings Rate is from Penn 
World Tables 6.1 and is defined as nominal income minus consumption minus government expenditure divided by nominal 
income (not PPP). Trade-Weighted World log GDP is constructed as in equation (7) using data from IMF Direction of Trade 
Statistics (2005) and Penn World Tables 6.1. Constraint on the Executive at Independence is from Polity. Year of 
independence is from the CIA World Factbook. Log Population Density in 1500 is from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
(2002). Log Settler Mortality is from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). Former colonies is the subsample colonized 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Democracy t-1 0.706 0.379 0.469 0.489 [0.00] -0.025 0.226
(0.035) (0.051) (0.100) (0.085) (0.088) (0.123)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 0.072 0.010 -0.104 -0.129 0.054 [0.33] 0.053 -0.318
(0.010) (0.035) (0.107) (0.076) (0.046) (0.066) (0.180)
Hansen J Test [0.26] [0.07]
AR(2) Test [0.45] [0.96]
Observations 945 945 838 838 958 2895 457 338
Countries 150 150 127 127 150 148 127 118
R-squared 0.73 0.80 0.76 0.93 0.77
Dependent Variable is Democracy
Table 2
Fixed Effects Results using Freedom House Measure of Democracy
Base Sample, 1960-2000
5-year data 10-year data
Pooled cross-sectional OLS regression in column 1, with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 2, 5, 6, and 7, with country 
dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Column 3 uses instrumental variables method of Anderson and Hsiao (1982), with clustered standard errors, and 
columns 4 and 8 use GMM of Arellano and Bond (1991), with robust standard errors; in both methods we instrument for income using a double lag. Year dummies are included in all 
regressions. Dependent variable is augmented Freedom House Political Rights Index. Base sample is an unbalanced panel, 1960-2000, with data at 5-year intervals, where the start date of the 
panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t=1960, so t-1=1955); column 6 uses annual data from the same sample; a country must be independent for 5 years before it enters the panel. 
Columns 7 and 8 use 10-year data from the same sample, where as before the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t=1960, so t-1=1950); a country must be independent 
for 10 years before it enters the panel. In column 6, each right hand side variable has five annual lags; we report the p-value from an F-test for the joint significance of all 5 lags. For detailed 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Democracy t-1 0.749 0.449 0.582 0.590 [0.00] 0.060 0.309
(0.034) (0.063) (0.127) (0.106) (0.091) (0.134)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 0.053 -0.006 -0.413 -0.351 -0.011 [0.53] 0.007 -0.368
(0.010) (0.039) (0.163) (0.127) (0.055) (0.070) (0.190)
Hansen J Test [0.03] [0.01]
AR(2) Test [0.39] [0.38]
Observations 854 854 747 747 880 3701 419 302
Countries 136 136 114 114 136 134 114 107
R-squared 0.77 0.82 0.77 0.96 0.77
Dependent Variable is Democracy
Table 3
Fixed Effects Results using Polity Measure of Democracy
Base Sample, 1960-2000
5-year data 10-year data
Pooled cross-sectional OLS regression in column 1, with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 2, 5, 6, and 7, with country 
dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Column 3 uses instrumental variables method of Anderson and Hsiao (1982), with clustered standard errors, and 
columns 4 and 8 use GMM of Arellano and Bond (1991), with robust standard errors; in both methods we instrument for income using a double lag. Year dummies are included in all 
regressions. Dependent variable is Polity Composite Democracy Index. Base sample is an unbalanced panel, 1960-2000, with data at 5-year intervals, where the start date of the panel refers to 
the dependent variable (i.e., t=1960, so t-1=1955); column 6 uses annual data from the same sample; a country must be independent for 5 years before it enters the panel. Columns 7 and 8 use 
10-year data from the same sample, where as before the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t=1960, so t-1=1950); a country must be independent for 10 years before it 
enters the panel. In column 6, each right hand side variables has five annual lags; we report the p-value from an F-test for the joint significance of all 5 lags. For detailed data definitions and 












































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Democracy t-1 0.283 0.472 [0.00] 0.410 0.520 [0.00] 0.397 0.563 [0.00] 0.362 0.436 [0.00]
(0.058) (0.092) (0.060) (0.096) (0.051) (0.080) (0.052) (0.085)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 -0.031 -0.262 [0.52] 0.069 0.044 [0.80] 0.030 -0.070 [0.54] 0.005 -0.151 [0.25]
(0.049) (0.128) (0.043) (0.084) (0.035) (0.074) (0.035) (0.078)
Hansen J Test [0.40] [0.31] [0.25] [0.34]
AR(2) Test [0.73] [0.83] [0.91] [0.49]
Observations 630 567 2328 660 591 1943 774 693 2358 908 823 2766
Countries 90 81 97 107 85 105 122 104 122 128 124 127
R-squared 0.80 0.93 0.78 0.93 0.81 0.94 0.79 0.93
5-year data 5-year data
Base Sample, 1960-2000, without 
Former Socialist Countries
5-year data
Base Sample, 1960-2000, without 
Muslim Countries





Dependent Variable is Democracy
Fixed Effects Results using Freedom House Measure of Democracy: Alternate Samples
Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, and 12 with country dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Columns 2, 5, 8, and 11 use GMM of Arellano 
and Bond (1991), with robust standard errors; in this method we instrument for income using a double lag. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Dependent variable is augmented Freedom House 
Political Rights Index. Base sample is an unbalanced panel, 1960-2000, with data at 5-year intervals in levels where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t=1960, so t-1=1955); 
columns 3, 6, 9, and 12 use annual data from the same sample; a country must be independent for 5 years before it enters panel. In columns 3, 6,  9, and 12 each right hand side variables has five annual 
lags; values in brackets are the p-value from an F-test of the joint significance of all 5 lags. Columns 1-3 use a balanced panel from 1970 to 2000. Columns 4-6 exclude sub-Saharan African countries. 
Columns 7-9 exclude countries where the percent of the population which is Muslim in 1980 exceeds 40 percent.  Columns 10-12 exclude Soviet bloc countries. For detailed data definitions and sources see













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Democracy t-1 0.687 0.353 0.480 0.625 0.351 0.499 0.619 0.352 0.475
(0.039) (0.053) (0.087) (0.044) (0.055) (0.097) (0.042) (0.050) (0.088)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 0.066 0.015 -0.008 0.047 -0.001 -0.121 0.061 -0.042 -0.126
(0.014) (0.041) (0.139) (0.020) (0.049) (0.182) (0.017) (0.045) (0.130)
Log Population t-1 0.001 -0.109 -0.001 -0.001 -0.042 0.049 0.005 -0.070 -0.016
(0.005) (0.100) (0.113) (0.006) (0.108) (0.143) (0.006) (0.112) (0.163)
Education t-1 0.012 -0.007 -0.020 0.022 -0.006 -0.011
(0.005) (0.020) (0.026) (0.007) (0.038) (0.052)
Age Structure t-1 [0.00] [0.05] [0.63] [0.06] [0.19] [0.27]
Barro (1999) Covariates NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES
Hansen J Test [0.08] [0.15] [0.25]
AR(2) Test [0.43] [0.88] [0.75]
Observations 863 863 731 676 676 589 676 676 588
Countries 142 142 120 95 95 92 96 96 92
R-squared 0.72 0.80 0.70 0.77 0.70 0.76
Dependent Variable is Democracy




Pooled cross-sectional OLS regressions in columns 1, 4, and 7, with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 2, 6, and 8, with country 
dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. GMM of Arellano-Bond in columns 3, 6, and 9, with robust standard errors; in this method we instrument for income using 
a double lag. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Dependent variable is augmented Freedom House Political Rights Index. Base sample is an unbalanced panel, 1960-2000, with data at 
5-year intervals, where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t=1960, so t-1=1955); a country must be independent for 5 years before it enters the panel. Education is 
average years of total schooling in the population in columns 4-6. Education is average years of primary schooling in the population in columns 7-9. Columns 1-6 include but do not display the 
median age of the population at t-1 and 4 covariates corresponding to the percent of the population at t-1 in the following age groups: 0-15, 15-30, 30-45, and 45-60. The age structure F-test is 
gives the p-value for the joint significance of these variables.  Columns 7-9 include but do not display additional covariates used by Barro (1999): male-female education gap and urbanization rate, 





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A
Democracy t-1 0.359 0.363 0.427 [0.00]
(0.054) (0.056) (0.100)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 0.233 0.044 0.009 -0.035 -0.020 -0.228 -0.045 -0.036 -0.074 0.016
(0.013) (0.051) (0.038) (0.094) (0.081) (0.102) (0.130) (0.191) (0.113) (0.095)
Labor Share t-1 0.250
(0.199)
Panel B
Democracy t-1 0.144 [0.24]
(0.066)
Labor Share t-1 0.329
(0.187)
Savings Rate t-2 1.356 1.343 1.483 1.202 1.173 1.022
(0.277) (0.270) (0.320) (0.315) (0.254) (0.218)
Savings Rate t-3 0.720
(0.182)
Hansen J Test [0.34]
AR(2) Test [0.72]
Observations 900 900 891 900 891 764 627 471 733 796
Countries 134 134 134 134 134 124 92 98 124 125
R-squared in First Stage 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.97
Table 6
Fixed Effects Results using Freedom House Measure of Democracy: Two Stage Least Squares with Savings Rate Instrument
Dependent Variable is Democracy
First Stage for Log GDP per Capita  t-1
All Countries All Countries
Base Sample, 1960-2000
Pooled cross-sectional OLS regression in column 1, with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 2 and 3 with country dummies and robust standard errors 
clustered by country in parentheses. Fixed effects 2SLS regressions in columns 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9 with country dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; first stage regressions are displayed in 
Panel B and include all second stage covariates (apart from income) on the right hand side with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. GMM of Arellano-Bond in column 6 with robust standard errors; in 
this method we instrument for income in the first differenced equation with the first difference of the instrument. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Dependent variable is augmented Freedom House Political 
Rights Index. Base sample is an unbalanced panel, 1960-2000, with data at 5-year intervals, where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t=1960, so t-1=1955); a country must be independent for 5 
years before it enters the panel. Column 7 excludes sub-Saharan African countries. Columns 4-10 instrument for Log GDP per Capita  t-1 with Savings Rate t-2. Column 10 includes Savings Rate t-3  as an additional instrument.
Column 9 includes but does not display Democracy t-1 ,  Democracyt-2, and Democracyt-3 ; we report the p-value from an F-test for the joint significance of all 3 lags. For detailed data definitions and sources see Table 1 and 






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A
Democracy t-1 0.376 0.393 0.478
(0.051) (0.057) (0.094)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 0.233 0.038 0.001 -0.213 -0.120 -0.133 -0.219 -0.202 -0.198 -0.217
(0.013) (0.045) (0.034) (0.150) (0.105) (0.077) (0.178) (0.130) (0.160) (0.149)





Trade-Weighted World Democracy t -1.195
(0.959)
Trade-Weighted World Log GDP t-1 0.402 0.421 0.320 0.441 0.529
(0.083) (0.082) (0.063) (0.070) (0.180)
Trade-Weighted World Log GDP t-2 0.341 -0.127
(0.090) (0.206)
Hansen J Test [0.19]
AR(2) Test [0.50]
Observations 906 906 895 906 895 812 616 906 906 906
Countries 124 124 124 124 124 122 81 124 124 124
R-squared in First Stage 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
Table 7
Fixed Effects Results using Freedom House Measure of Democracy: Two Stage Least Squares with Trade-Weighted World Income Instrument
Dependent Variable is Democracy




Pooled cross-sectional OLS regression in column 1, with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 2 and 3 with country dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country in 
parentheses. Fixed effects 2SLS regressions in columns 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 and 10 with country dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; first stage regressions are displayed in Panel B and include all second stage 
covariates excluding income on the right hand side with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. GMM of Arellano-Bond in column 6 with robust standard errors; in this method we instrument for income in the first differenced
equation with the first difference of the instrument. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Dependent variable is augmented Freedom House Political Rights Index. Base sample is an unbalanced panel, 1960-2000, with data at 5-year 
intervals, where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t=1960, so t-1=1955); a country must be independent for 5 years before it enters the panel. Column 7 excludes sub-Saharan African countries. Columns 5-8 
instrument for Log GDP per Capita t-1 with Trade-Weighted World Log GDP t-1. Column 9 uses Trade-Weighted World Log GDP t-2  as an alternative instrument. Column 10 includes both Trade-Weighted World Log GDP  t-1  and Trade-



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A
Democracy t-1 0.410 0.482 0.393 0.478 0.394 0.478
(0.069) (0.093) (0.057) (0.094) (0.057) (0.095)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 -0.348 -0.215 -0.124 -0.213 -0.119 -0.133 -0.237 -0.127 -0.134
(0.326) (0.217) (0.079) (0.151) (0.105) (0.078) (0.168) (0.107) (0.082)
Panel B
Democracy t-1 0.170 0.169 0.173
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
Trade-Weighted World Log GDP t-1 0.394 0.422
(0.182) (0.182)
Trade-Weighted World Log GDP t-1 with 2 Step Adjustment for Bias 0.403 0.421
(0.085) (0.083)
Trade-Weighted World Log GDP t-1 with Gravity Estimated Weights 0.396 0.418
(0.101) (0.099)
Hansen J Test [0.30] [0.19] [0.22]
AR(2) Test [0.50] [0.50] [0.50]
Observations 899 888 805 906 895 812 906 895 812
Countries 123 123 121 124 124 122 124 124 122
R-squared in First Stage 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.96
Table 8
Fixed Effects Results using Freedom House Measure of Democracy: Two Stage Least Squares with Trade-Weighted World Income Instrument Robustness Checks
Dependent Variable is Democracy
First Stage for Log GDP per Capita t-1
Base Sample, 1960-2000
Base Sample, 1960-2000 without 
Singapore
Fixed effects 2SLS regressions in columns 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8 with country dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; first stage regressions are displayed in Panel B and include all second stage 
covariates excluding income on the right hand side with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. GMM of Arellano-Bond in columns 3, 6, and 9 with robust standard errors; in this method we instrument 
for income in the first differenced equation with the first difference of the instrument. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Dependent variable is augmented Freedom House Political Rights Index. Base sample is an 
unbalanced panel, 1960-2000, with data at 5-year intervals, where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t=1960, so t-1=1955); a country must be independent for 5 years before it enters the panel. 
Columns 1-3 exclude Singapore. Columns 1-3 instrument for Log GDP per Capita t-1 with Trade-Weighted World Log GDP t-1. Columns 4-6 instrument for Log GDP per Capita t-1 with Trade-Weighted World Log GDP t-1  
with a 2 Step Adjustment for Bias; this is constructed using the same sample as Table 7, column 4 and following a procedure described in Section 4.2 of the text and in the Appendix. Columns 7-9 instrument for Log GDP 
per Capita t-1 with Trade-Weighted World Log GDP t-1  with Gravity Estimated Weights (using Frankel and Romer, 1999 specification). For detailed data definitions and sources see Table 1 and Appendix Table A1. See 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All Countries
Democracy t-1 0.841 0.652 0.433 0.455 0.230
(0.039) (0.089) (0.121) (0.136) (0.238)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 0.072 -0.076 -0.183 -0.109 -0.035 -0.092
(0.017) (0.064) (0.090) (0.107) (0.135) (0.287)
Hansen J Test [1.00] [1.00]
AR(2) Test [0.40] [0.05]
Observations 358 358 297 370 188 142
Countries 28 28 27 28 28 28
R-squared 0.78 0.81 0.69 0.75
Panel B: All Countries
Democracy t-1 0.772 0.682 0.443 0.407 0.287
(0.043) (0.070) (0.096) (0.082) (0.104)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 0.081 0.066 -0.041 0.135 0.134 0.176
(0.015) (0.032) (0.033) (0.072) (0.070) (0.112)
Hansen J Test [1.00] [1.00]
AR(2) Test [0.83] [0.93]
Observations 656 656 578 682 342 285
Countries 28 28 28 28 28 28
R-squared 0.79 0.80 0.63 0.70
Panel C: Without Venezuela
Democracy t-1 0.771 0.673 0.427 0.400 0.244
(0.045) (0.074) (0.099) (0.085) (0.105)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 0.078 0.041 -0.058 0.104 0.076 0.099
(0.015) (0.030) (0.034) (0.079) (0.068) (0.147)
Hansen J Test [1.00] [1.00]
AR(2) Test [0.91] [0.96]
Observations 637 637 562 662 331 276
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27
R-squared 0.78 0.80 0.63 0.69
Table 9
Polity Measure of Democracy in the Long Run
Dependent Variable is Democracy, 1840-2000
Dependent Variable is Democracy, 1840-2000
Dependent Variable is Democracy, 1840-1940
10-year data 5-year data
Pooled cross-sectional OLS regression in column 1, with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Fixed effects OLS regressions in 
columns 2, 4, and 5, with country dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Column 3 and 6 use GMM of Arellano and Bond 
(1991), with robust standard errors; in both methods we instrument for income using a double lag. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Dependent 
variable is Polity Composite Democracy Index.  Base sample is all countries with at least 5 observations in the 5-year data between 1840 and 1900 and 
which are independent by 1900. Columns 1-4 use 5-year data where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t=1840, so t-1=1835); a 
country must be independent for 5 years before it enters the panel. Columns 5 and 6 use 10-year data where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent 
variable (i.e., t=1840, so t-1=1830); a country must be independent for 10 years before it enters the panel. Panel A uses a long sample, 1840-1940, Panels B 
and C use 1840-2000. Panel C drops Venezuela. GDP per capita is from Maddison (2003).  For detailed data definitions and sources see Table 1 and 
Appendix Table A1.OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Change in Log GDP per Capita Over Sample Period 0.139 0.148 0.126 0.097 0.065 0.048 -0.006 -0.002
(0.033) (0.035) (0.025) (0.019) (0.042) (0.024) (0.054) (0.047)
Constraint on the Executive at Independence 0.131 0.139 0.154
(0.075) (0.109) (0.077)
Independence Year/100 -0.222 -0.211 -0.204
(0.020) (0.028) (0.013)
Log Population Density in 1500 -0.066 -0.047 -0.057
(0.042) (0.043) (0.044)
Log Settler Mortality -0.053 -0.030
(0.016) (0.030)
Observations 143 143 78 65 78 78 65 78
R-squared 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.23 0.22 0.28 0.41 0.33
Table 10
Polity Measure of Democracy in the Very Long Run
Former European Colonies, 1500-1995 Base Sample, 1500-1995
Dependent Variable is Change in Democracy Over Sample Period
All countries in 1500 assumed to have the lowest possible democracy score
Cross-section OLS regression in all columns, with robust standard errors clustered by aggregation level of the region for GDP per Capita in 1500. In columns 3-8 data represents all available values 
in the former colonies sample for which Constraint on the Executive at Independence, Independence Year, and Log Population Density in 1500 are available. Changes are total differences between 
1500 and 1995. GDP per capita is from Maddison (2003), and democracy is calculated using the Polity Composite Democracy Index, which comprises in part constraint on the executive. Column 1 
assumes some democracy in 1500 in a few European countries, following Acemoglu et al (2004b). Democracy in 1500 is assigned to lowest possible score for all countries in columns 2-8. For 
detailed data definitions and sources see Table 1 and Appendix Table A1.Balanced 
Panel 1970-
2000
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Democracy t-1 0.672 0.283 0.636 0.668 0.573 0.538 0.567 0.471
(0.048) (0.062) (0.050) (0.050) (0.047) (0.049) (0.047) (0.064)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 0.059 -0.088 0.039 0.046 0.025 0.016 0.012 0.008
(0.014) (0.050) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.018) (0.014) (0.020)
Constraint on the Executive at Independence 0.170 0.178 0.175 0.212
(0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.036)
Independence Year/100 -0.101 -0.101 -0.098 -0.135
(0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.022)
Log Population Density in 1500 -0.013 -0.011 -0.013 -0.019
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010)
Log Settler Mortality -0.033 -0.009
(0.011) (0.010)
Observations 541 541 486 541 541 486 541 336
Countries 80 80 68 80 80 68 80 48
R-squared 0.62 0.72 0.63 0.62 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.63
Table 11
Effect of Historical Factors on Democracy: Former Colonies, using Freedom House Measure of Democracy




Pooled cross-sectional OLS in columns 1 and 3-8, with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Fixed effects OLS regressions in column 2, with country 
dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Dependent variable is augmented Freedom House 
Political Rights Index.  Data are at 5-year intervals, for former European colonies. Columns 1-7 are an unbalanced panel in levels where the start date of the panel refers to the 
dependent variable (i.e., t=1960, so t-1=1955); a country must be independent for 10 years before it enters the panel.  Column 8 is a balanced panel from 1970 to 2000; a 
country must be independent by 1960 to enter the panel and first lagged value is 1965. In all columns, data represents all available values in the former colonies sample for 
which Constraint on the Executive at Independence, Independence Year, and Log Population Density in 1500 are available. For detailed data definitions and sources see Table 1 












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A
Democracy t-1 0.347 0.493 0.356 0.495 0.354 0.496
(0.056) (0.090) (0.056) (0.089) (0.055) (0.089)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 -0.003 -0.141 0.003 -0.148 0.009 -0.155
(0.047) (0.088) (0.047) (0.091) (0.047) (0.092)
Crisis t-1 0.044 0.057 0.059 0.063 0.074 0.096
(0.019) (0.024) (0.021) (0.026) (0.025) (0.029)
Hansen J Test [0.41] [0.46] [0.58]
AR(2) Test [0.73] [0.57] [0.74]
R-squared 0.79 0.79 0.79
Panel B
Democracy t-1 0.602 0.697 0.609 0.698 0.607 0.699
(0.038) (0.062) (0.039) (0.062) (0.038) (0.062)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 -0.004 -0.067 0.001 -0.071 0.005 -0.079
(0.034) (0.062) (0.034) (0.064) (0.034) (0.066)
Crisis t-1 0.038 0.045 0.045 0.051 0.049 0.067
(0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021)
Hansen J Test [0.05] [0.04] [0.04]
AR(2) Test [0.23] [0.35] [0.18]
R-squared 0.89 0.89 0.89
Panel C
Democracy t-1 0.744 0.796 0.747 0.796 0.747 0.797
(0.038) (0.054) (0.038) (0.054) (0.038) (0.053)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 0.001 -0.074 0.002 -0.076 0.003 -0.076
(0.023) (0.057) (0.022) (0.058) (0.022) (0.058)
Crisis t-1 0.006 0.012 0.014 0.013 0.025 0.029
(0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.017)
Hansen J Test [0.14] [0.16] [0.21]
AR(2) Test [0.51] [0.47] [0.48]
R-squared 0.93 0.93 0.93
Observations 739 659 739 659 739 659
Countries 124 122 124 122 124 122
Dependent Variable is Transition toward Democracy
Dependent Variable is Transition away from Democracy
Table 12
Fixed Effects Results for Crises, using Freedom House Measure of Democracy
Dependent Variable is Democracy
Base Sample, 1965-2000
Crisis threshold is -3% Crisis threshold is -4% Crisis threshold is -5%
Fixed effects OLS with country dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country in columns 1, 3, and 5; GMM of Arellano-Bond in columns 
2, 4, and 6, with robust standard errors; in this method we instrument for income and for crises using a double lag. Year dummies are included in all 
regressions. The dependent variable in Panel A is the augmented Freedom House Political Rights Index, in Panel B, Transition towards Democracy, 
calculated as max(d it,d it-1) from this Index, and in Panel C Transition away from Democracy, calculated as min(d it,d it-1) from this Index. Base 
sample is an unbalanced panel, 1965-2000, with data at 5-year intervals in levels where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable 
(i.e., t=1965, so t-1=1960).  Countries must be independent for 15 years before they enter the panel. Crisis is a dummy variable corresponding to a 
change in the growth rate by more than a threshold. In columns 1 and 2 the threshold is –3%, in columns 3 and 4 the threshold is –4%, and in 
columns 5 and 6 the threshold is –5%. See text for details. For detailed data definitions and sources see Table 1 and Appendix Table A1.VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE
Freedom House Political 
Rights Index, also refered to 
here as Freedom House 
Measure of Democracy
Data for 1972-2000 in Freedom House Political Rights Index, original range 
1,2,3,…,7 normalized 0-1.  Data for 1972 used for 1970. Data for 1950, 1955, 
1960 and 1965, in Bollen, original range 0.00,0.01,…0.99,1. Transitions to 
democracy are calculated as max((d it,d it-1) and transitions to non-democracy 
are calculated as min(d it,d it-1).
http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/, and Bollen (2001) 
"Cross National Indicators of Liberal Democracy 1950-
1990" available on ICPSR
Polity Composite 
Democracy Index, also 
refered to here as the Polity 
Measure of Democracy
Data for 1840-2000 in Polity IV.  The composite index is the democracy score 
minus the autocracy score.  Original range -10,-9,...10, normalized 0-1. 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/
Polity Composite 
Democracy Index in 1500
Constructed using constraint on the executive score from Acemoglu, Johnson, 
and Robinson (2004) for the sample of European countries. Components of 
the index other than constraint on the executive are assigned a value of zero 
for all countries.
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2004)
GDP per Capita (Chain 
Weighted 1996 Prices)
Data for 1950-2000 measured as Log Real GDP per Capita (Chain Method in 
1996 prices) from Penn World Tables 6.1.
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
GDP per Capita (1990 
dollars)
Data for 1800-2000 measured as Log Real GDP per Capita (1990 Geary-
Khamis dollars) from Maddison (2003).
http://www.eco.rug.nl/~Maddison/
Population Total population in thousands. World Bank (2002)
Education Average total years of schooling in the population aged 25 and over.  Data for 
1960, 1965,…, 1995 from Barro and Lee.  We include average years of 
primary schooling in the population aged 25 and over in specifications which 
include the same covariates as Barro (1999).
Barro and Lee (2000) available at 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html
Age Structure Data for 1950, 1955,…, 2000 from United Nations Population Division 
(2002).  These variables are median age of the population and fraction of the 
population 5 different age ranges: 0 to 15, 15 to 30, 30 to 45, 45 to 60, and 60 
and above.  
United Nations Population Division (2003)
Male-Female Education 
Gap
Gap between male and female primary schooling in the population aged 25 
and over.  Data for 1960, 1965,…,1995 from Barro and Lee.
Barro and Lee (2000) available at 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html
Urbanization Rate Percent of population living in urban areas, 0-1 scale. World Bank (2002)
Significant Oil Producer "1" if country is described by IMF as oil exporting. This is used as opposed to 
OPEC in line with Barro (1999).
following Barro (1999)
Savings Rate Data for 1950-2000 measured as (Y-G-C)/Y from Penn World Tables 6.1 
where Y is nominal income, C is nominal consumption, and G is nominal 
government spending.
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
Labor Share Labor share of value added from Rodrik (1999). 0-1 scale. Rodrik (1999)
Appendix Table A1VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE
Trade-Weighted World Log 
GDP
Constructed using GDP per Capita from Penn World Tables 6.1 and average 
trade shares between 1980 and 1989 from International Monetary Fund 
Direction of Trade Statistics (2005) according to procedures described in 
Appendix.  




Constructed using Freedom House Political Rights Index, GDP per Capita 
from Penn World Tables 6.1, and average trade shares between 1980 and 
1989 from International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics (2005) 
according to procedures described in Appendix.
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/, IMF DoTS CD-ROM (2005), 
and http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/, and Bollen 
(2001) "Cross National Indicators of Liberal Democracy 
1950-1990" available on ICPSR
Trade-Weighted World Log 
GDP with Gravity 
Estimated Weights
Constructed using GDP per Capita from Penn World Tables 6.1 and average 
trade shares between 1980 and 1989 from International Monetary Fund 
Direction of Trade Statistics (2005) according to procedures described in 
Appendix.  Additional data for estimation of the gravity equation from CIA 
World Factbook (2004), World Development Indicators (2002), and Glick and 
Rose (2002). Using the same specification as in Frankel and Romer (1999). 
See Appendix for more details.
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/, IMF DoTS CD-ROM (2005), 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/, World 
Bank (2002), and 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm#Softw
are
Constraint on the Executive 
at Independence
Data in Polity IV, original range 1,2,3...7, normalized 0-1. Calculated as the 
average of constraint on the executive in a country during the first 10 years 
after its independence (ignoring missing data). If data for the first 10 years 
after independence is missing, we find the first year these data are available in 
Polity, then average over the following ten years (ignoring missing data).
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/
Independence year Year when country became independent, with any year before 1800 coded as 
1800. We coded Taiwan's independence year to 1948 and changed 
Zimbabwe's independence year to 1964. Classification of countries follows 
Polity.
CIA World Factbook (2004) available at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/
Population Density in 1500 Indigenous population divided by arable land in 1500. Acemoglu et al (2002)
Settler mortality Historical mortality rates of potential European settlers. Acemoglu et al (2001)
Religion Percent of population in 1980 which is (1) Catholic, (2) Protestant, or (3) 
Muslim.











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Savings Rate Instrument
Democracy t-1 0.452 0.451 0.638
(0.064) (0.064) (0.110)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 0.225 -0.009 -0.003 -0.029 -0.020 -0.290
(0.014) (0.059) (0.042) (0.084) (0.075) (0.127)
Hansen J Test [0.02]
AR(2) Test [0.38]
Observations 827 827 804 827 804 673
Countries 121 121 121 121 121 113
Panel B: Trade-Weighted World Income Instrument
Democracy t-1 0.440 0.432 0.589
(0.063) (0.070) (0.108)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 0.227 -0.035 -0.022 -0.417 -0.264 -0.260
(0.014) (0.052) (0.037) (0.198) (0.128) (0.117)
Hansen J Test [0.03]
AR(2) Test [0.39]
Observations 839 839 815 839 815 730
Countries 113 113 113 113 113 112
Appendix Table A2
Fixed Effects Results using Polity Measure of Democracy: Two Stage Least Squares
Dependent Variable is Democracy
Dependent Variable is Democracy
Base Sample, 1960-2000
Pooled cross-sectional OLS regression in column 1, with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 2 and 3 with country 
dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Fixed effects 2SLS regressions in columns 4 and 5 with country dummies and robust standard errors clustered 
by country in parentheses; first stage regressions are not displayed but are similar in Panel A to Table 6, Panel B, columns 4 and 5, and are similar in Panel B to Table 7, Panel B, 
columns 4 and 5. GMM of Arellano-Bond in column 6 with robust standard errors; in this method we instrument for income in the first differenced equation with the first difference of 
the instrument. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Dependent variable is Polity Composite Democracy Index. Base sample is an unbalanced panel, 1960-2000, with data at 
5-year intervals, where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t=1960, so t-1=1955); a country must be independent for 5 years before it enters the panel. Panel 
A, columns 4-6 instrument Log GDP per Capita t-1 with Savings Rate t-2. Panel B, columns 4-6 instrument Log GDP per Capita t-1 with Trade-Weighted World Log GDP t-1. For 
detailed data definitions and sources see Table 1 and Appendix Table A1. See Appendix for details on the construction of the instruments.Balanced 
Panel 1970-
2000
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Democracy t-1 0.723 0.354 0.711 0.720 0.643 0.622 0.637 0.549
(0.047) (0.078) (0.050) (0.048) (0.054) (0.057) (0.053) (0.083)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 0.043 -0.056 0.032 0.032 0.015 0.009 0.004 -0.010
(0.014) (0.060) (0.017) (0.014) (0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.020)
Constraint on the Executive at Independence 0.131 0.153 0.137 0.169
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.050)
Independence Year/100 -0.083 -0.087 -0.081 -0.119
(0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.029)
Log Population Density in 1500 -0.010 -0.009 -0.011 -0.019
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
Log Settler Mortality -0.019 -0.001
(0.010) (0.010)
Observations 514 514 462 514 514 462 514 273
Countries 80 80 68 80 80 68 80 39
R-squared 0.68 0.76 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.70 0.71
Appendix Table A3
Effect of Historical Factors on Democracy: Former Colonies, using Polity Measure of Democracy




Pooled cross-sectional OLS in columns 1 and 3-8, with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Fixed effects OLS regressions in column 2, with country 
dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Dependent variable is Polity Composite Democracy 
Index.  Data are at 5-year intervals, for former European colonies. Columns 1-7 are an unbalanced panel in levels where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent 
variable (i.e., t=1960, so t-1=1955); a country must be independent for 10 years before it enters the panel.  Column 8 is a balanced panel from 1970 to 2000; a country must be 
independent by 1960 to enter the panel and first lagged value is 1965. In all columns, data represents all available values in the former colonies sample for which Constraint on 
the Executive at Independence, Independence Year, and Log Population Density in 1500 are available. For detailed data definitions and sources see Table 1 and Appendix Table 
A1. Country Code Country Code Country Code
Andorra ADO Ghana GHA Netherlands NLD
Afghanistan AFG Guinea GIN Norway NOR
Angola AGO Gambia, The GMB Nepal NPL
Albania ALB Guinea-Bissau GNB New Zealand NZL
United Arab Emirates ARE Equatorial Guinea GNQ Oman OMN
Argentina ARG Greece GRC Pakistan-post-1972 PAK
Armenia ARM Grenada GRD Pakistan-pre-1972 PAK_1
Antigua ATG Guatemala GTM Panama PAN
Australia AUS Guyana GUY Peru PER
Austria AUT Honduras HND Philippines PHL
Azerbaijan AZE Croatia HRV Papua New Guinea PNG
Burundi BDI Haiti HTI Poland POL
Belgium BEL Hungary HUN Korea, Dem. Rep. PRK
Benin BEN Indonesia IDN Portugal PRT
Burkina Faso BFA India IND Paraguay PRY
Bangladesh BGD Ireland IRL Qatar QAT
Bulgaria BGR Iran IRN Romania ROM
Bahrain BHR Iraq IRQ Russia RUS
Bahamas BHS Iceland ISL Rwanda RWA
Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH Israel ISR Saudi Arabia SAU
Belarus BLR Italy ITA Sudan SDN
Belize BLZ Jamaica JAM Senegal SEN
Bolivia BOL Jordan JOR Singapore SGP
Brazil BRA Japan JPN Solomon Islands SLB
Barbados BRB Kazakhstan KAZ Sierra Leone SLE
Brunei BRN Kenya KEN El Salvador SLV
Bhutan BTN Kyrgyz Republic KGZ Somalia SOM
Botswana BWA Cambodia KHM Sao Tome and Principe STP
Central African Republic CAF Kiribati KIR Suriname SUR
Canada CAN St. Kitts and Nevis KNA Slovakia SVK
Switzerland CHE Korea, Rep. KOR Slovenia SVN
Chile CHL Kuwait KWT Sweden SWE
China CHN Lao PDR LAO Swaziland SWZ
Cote d'Ivoire CIV Lebanon LBN Seychelles SYC
Cameroon CMR Liberia LBR Syrian Arab Republic SYR
Congo, Rep. COG Libya LBY Chad TCD
Colombia COL St. Lucia LCA Togo TGO
Comoros COM Liechtenstein LIE Thailand THA
Cape Verde CPV Sri Lanka LKA Tajikistan TJK
Costa Rica CRI Lesotho LSO Turkmenistan TKM
Cuba CUB Lithuania LTU Tonga TON
Cyprus CYP Luxembourg LUX Trinidad and Tobago TTO
Czech Republic CZE Latvia LVA Tunisia TUN
Germany DEU Morocco MAR Turkey TUR
Djibouti DJI Moldova MDA Taiwan TWN
Dominica DMA Madagascar MDG Tanzania TZA
Denmark DNK Maldives MDV Uganda UGA
Dominican Republic DOM Mexico MEX Ukraine UKR
Algeria DZA Macedonia, FYR MKD Uruguay URY
Ecuador ECU Mali MLI United States USA
Egypt, Arab Rep. EGY Malta MLT Uzbekistan UZB
Eritrea ERI Myanmar MMR St. Vincent and the Grenadines VCT
Spain ESP Mongolia MNG Venezuela, RB VEN
Estonia EST Mozambique MOZ Vietnam VNM
Ethiopia ETH Mauritania MRT Vanuatu VUT
East Timor ETM Mauritius MUS Western Samoa WSM
Finland FIN Malawi MWI Yemen YEM
Fiji FJI Malaysia MYS Yugoslavia - post 1991 YUG
France FRA Namibia NAM South Africa ZAF
Gabon GAB Niger NER Congo, Dem. Rep. ZAR
United Kingdom GBR Nigeria NGA Zambia ZMB
Georgia GEO Nicaragua NIC Zimbabwe ZWE
Codes Used to Represent Countries in Figures
Appendix Table A4See Appendix Table A1 for data definitions and sources. Changes are total difference between 1970 and 1995.  Countries are included if they were independent by 1970.  
Start and end dates are chosen to maximize the number of countries in the cross-section. The regression represented by the fitted line yields a coefficient of 0.032 



















































































































































-1 0 1 2
Change in Log GDP per Capita (Penn World Tables)
Change in Democracy and Change in Income, 1970-1995




































































































































-1 0 1 2
Change in Log GDP per Capita (Penn World Tables)
Change in Democracy and Change in Income, 1970-1995
Figure 2See Appendix Table A1 for data definitions and sources.  Values are averaged by country from 1990 to 1999. GDP per Capita is in PPP terms. The regression represented 

























































































































































































6 7 8 9 10
Log GDP per Capita (Penn World Tables)
Democracy and Income, 1990s
Figure 3Log GDP per Capita is from Maddison (2003).  See Appendix Table A1 for data definitions and sources. Changes are total difference between 1870 and 1995.  Countries 
are included if they are in the 200-year sample discussed in Section 6 of the text and were independent by 1870. Start and end dates are chosen to maximize the number 


































































1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Change in Log GDP per Capita (Maddison)
Change in Democracy and Change in Income, 1870-1995
Figure 4See Appendix Table A1 for data definitions and sources. Changes are total differences between 1500 and 1995. GDP per capita is from Maddison. Democracy is 
calculated using the Polity measure of democracy, which comprises in part constraint on the executive; data for 1500 from Acemoglu et al (2004b). The end date is 
chosen to maximize the number of countries in the cross-section. The regression represented by the fitted line yields a coefficient of 0.139 (standard error=0.033), N=143, 
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0 1 2 3 4
Change in Log GDP per Capita
Change in Democracy and Change in Income, 1500-1995
Figure 5See Appendix Table A1 for data definitions and sources.  Country fixed effects are those estimated in the specification of Table 11, column 2 using Freedom House 































































































2 4 6 8
Log Settler Mortality
Democracy Fixed Effect and Log Settler Mortality
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Log Population Density 1500
Democracy Fixed Effect and Log Population Density in 1500









































































































0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Constraint on the Executive at Independence
Democracy Fixed Effect and Constraint on the Executive at Independence
Figure 8See notes to Figure 6. We divide independence year by 100 in order that the coefficient estimates in Table 11 be visible. The regression represented by the fitted line 








































































































18 18.5 19 19.5 20
Independence Year/100
Democracy Fixed Effect and Independence Year
Figure 9See Appendix Table A1 for data definitions and sources. Changes are total differences between 1500 and 1995 (see Figure 5 for the construction of these differences) in 
the sample of former European  colonies which are not predicted in a linear regression by historical determinants of development path: Log Settler Mortality, Log 
Population Density in 1500, Constraint on the Executive at Independence, and Independence Year. This corresponds to the residual plot of the regression in Table 10, 
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Change in Log GDP per Capita
Independent of Historical Factors
Conditional on Historical Factors
Change in Democracy and Change in Income, 1500-1995
Figure 10